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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a national tragedy; it is invisible, hidden behind doors of confi-
dentiality. Approximately 35,000 brothers and sisters a year are sepa-
rated into different foster or adoptive homes without a formal or
statutorily mandated due process hearing.' Siblings' rights to family
* Professor, Whittier Law School. M.A., 1974, U.C.L.A., J.D., 1977, U.C.L.A. School of
Law. The author thanks the Cook Foundation for its continuing support and commitment to
bettering the plight of dependent and orphaned children.
** Clinical faculty member, U.C.L.A.-Neuropsychiatric Institute, Department of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry. J.D., 1977, U.C.L.A. School of Law, M.D., Case Western Reserve
School of Medicine, 1986, U.C.L.A. School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, 1989,
U.C.L.A. School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, Child Division, 1991, U.C.L.A.
Department of Pediatrics, Child Abuse and Neglect Interdisciplinary Graduate Training Program,
1991. 1 am grateful to Dr. Herbert Morris, whose thoughtful commentary contributed greatly to
this writing, and to my editor Dorothy Hines, who clarified and simplified my thoughts.
i. For a detailed analysis of sibling statistics, see infra part III. Although siblings may have
their rights resolved as part of other hearings to determine custody, wardship, parental severance,
or adoption, statutes do not provide specific hearings to determine the scope of siblings'
association rights.
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integrity are so undervalued that no national data exists concerning their
placements, and state and county records are non-existent or woefully
incomplete.2 Although recognized by the Federal Adoption and Assist-
ance Act as "hard to place" children who require extra efforts and subsi-
dies for placement, siblings have been substantially excluded from the
definition and central goals of family reunification. Brother and sister
family units have not only been neglected by agencies, but lawyers and
judges have also failed to focus adequately upon the emotional turmoil
of siblings caught in the child dependency maelstrom. These children
have been traumatized by family abuse or neglect, separated from their
parents while court machinery labored, and torn from their last remain-
ing psychological bond, a brother or sister, during the height of their
greatest emotional plight.
It is a critical moment for siblings.' For example, California, the
state with the largest number of siblings in out-of-home care, recently
determined that the Juvenile Court has no statutory obligation to put
siblings in the same out-of-home placement, but as the concurring opin-
ion noted, "I am concerned with the majority's broad statement that
juvenile law expresses no affirmative duty to keep siblings together."5 It
is time to provide siblings with protection. This Article will begin to
build a due process structure, a mandatory legal barrier between siblings
2. None of the following national children's organizations maintains any data regarding
siblings: 1) American Humane Association American Association For Protecting Children; 2)
National Center For Juvenile Justice; 3) Clearinghouse On Child Abuse And Neglect Information;
4) National Foster Care Resource Center; 5) National Association Of Counsel For Children; and
6) National Resource Center On Child Sexual Abuse. See Letter from Robyn Alsop, Information
Services Coordinator, American Humane Assoc. Am. Assoc. Protecting Children (July 13, 1990)
(on file letters to Professor Patton in the Whittier Law Library); Ellen Nimick, Manager of Data
Collection, National Juvenile Court Data Archive (July 23, 1990) (same); Sandi McLeod,
Information Specialist, Clearinghouse Child Abuse & Neglect Info. (July 31, 1992) (same);
Patricia Ryan, Administrative Director, National Foster Care Resource Ctr. (Sept. 21, 1992)
(same); Laura Freemen Michaels, Executive Director, National Ass'n Counsel for Children (July
2, 1992) (same); Kathryn Sisterman Keeney, National Resource Ctr. Child Sexual Abuse (July 6,
1992) (same).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 673.
4. It is a critical time for all children trapped by the child dependency system. The United
States Supreme Court recently held in Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), that there is no
private federal remedy for children separated because of a state's failure to vigorously pursue
family reunification services. In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1992), held than an Oregon statute
excluding relatives from state foster care subsidies was constitutional and rationally related to the
state's decisions regarding the best interests of the children. Therefore, children unlucky enough
to have poor relatives will be forced to live with strangers in foster care or with relatives whose
budget will be inadequate to meet the additional needs of the child. For a history and analysis of
relative out-of-home care, see Elizabeth Killackey, Kinship Foster Care, 26 FAM. L.Q. 211
(1992).
5. In re Gerald J., 2 Cal. Rptr. 569, 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (Nares, A.J., concurring).
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and the state in the area of child dependency, parental severance, and
state-mandated adoption hearings. A subsequent article will delineate
siblings' rights in civil domestic relations cases.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE GENESIS AND CURRENT STATUS OF
SIBLINGS' RIGHTS
No supreme court has determined the constitutional nature of sib-
lings' association rights. As late as 1987, the court in Crim v. Harrison
noted that it was "unable to find, any cases which recognize the right of
siblings whose custody has been granted to the state to reside together."
6
One court has determined that adult siblings do not even have standing
to seek visitation with minor siblings still residing with their parents.7
Still other courts have found that siblings do not possess a relationship
sufficiently similar to that of parent and child to warrant wrongful death
or § 1983 damages.8 Although a few courts recently have begun to rec-
ognize the importance of sibling rights, case law has merely focused
upon whether the trial court abused its discretion or ruled without suffi-
cient evidence; constitutional analysis of siblings' due process rights is
almost non-existent.9
One of the principal goals of this study is to ameliorate the harsh
results of the historical genesis of siblings' rights. Unfortunately, most
attorneys involved with children's issues have assumed that courts and
social services personnel would not needlessly separate siblings. Chil-
dren's advocates initially assumed that the family reunification mandates
of the Federal Adoption and Assistance Act10 would focus pressure upon
agencies to keep brothers and sisters together whenever possible. Nev-
ertheless, as the court in Division of Family Services v. Florida noted,
6. 552 F. Supp. 37, 39 n.2 (N.D. Mass. 1987).
7. Weber v. Weber, 534 A.2d 498 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
8. Cabrales v. County of L.A., 644 F. Supp. 1352 (C.D. Cal., 1986); Sanchez v. Marqez, 457
F. Supp. 359 (D. Colo. 1978); Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d. 207 (La. Ct. App. 1985), later
proceeding, 522 So. 2d 1259 (1988); see also Maureen Delaney, What About the Children?
Toward an Expansion of Loss of Consortium Recovery in the District of Columbia, 41 AM. U. L.
REv. 107 (1991).
9. See, e.g., In re Elizabeth M., 283 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1991); Division of Family Servs. v.
Florida, 319 So. 2d 72 (Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Pullman v. Pullman, 560 A.2d 1276 (N.J. Super.
1988); Mark v. Gale P., 540 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Fam. Ct. 1989). It is common for courts to separate
abused siblings into different foster homes without even giving the children a formal hearing
regarding their interests to continue visiting with one another. See, e.g., In re Brooke D., Veronica
D., Jessica D., Raven D., Honey D. and Ronald D., 598 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (App. Div. 1993) (trial
court ordered siblings "ranging in age from six to 17... [into] foster care in different foster homes
as a result of a finding of abuse of one child and neglect of the others by their father." The court
relied on recommendations by the children's therapists rather than holding a hearing to determine
whether the siblings should visit one another while in foster care).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 673 (6)(B)(C)(2)(A).
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there is often a conflict between the best long-term interests of a sibling
group and the social services agencies' short-term "fears that their foster
home or shelter would be lost if the agency insisted that the ... children
remain together."" Therefore, platitudes such as "separation of siblings
is discouraged" or statutory mandates to keep siblings together unless
"overriding reason[s]" exist have failed to protect these children from
being needlessly separated and permanently deprived of the benefits of
their family relationship.' 2 The following are a few examples of the
current statutory and case law failures in protecting siblings' association
rights:
1. When Linda Kocsis was 31 she was given her adoption papers
as a Christmas present. Upon reading the documents she discovered that
she lived "within a few miles" of her brother. Five other previously
unknown siblings also lived in the same state. The siblings, however,
did not know of one another because their birth father placed two of the
siblings for adoption after his divorce and their birth mother never
informed him that she was pregnant with a third sibling.'3
2. In In re Jennifer C.,' 4 a dependency petition alleged that par-
ents had neglected their three children, Jennifer, Michelle, and John, Jr.
Another child, Michael, was born eight months later. The department
temporarily placed all of the children with their paternal grandmother.
After a series of review hearings, the court removed the children from
their parents. "Jennifer was placed with her grandmother again, but
Michelle, John Jr., and Michael were placed in a non-relative foster
home.'" After a subsequent hearing, the parents' rights were
terminated.
The social worker's report indicated that the siblings were emotion-
ally bonded and wanted to stay together.I6 Although the paternal grand-
mother had expressed interest in adopting Jennifer, when a new social
worker took over the case for the adoption assessment, she "did not con-
tact the children, Cynthia [the birth mother] ... Mrs. Massey [the pater-
11. 319 So. 2d 72, 77 (1st DCA 1985).
12. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mayer, 347 N.W. 2d 681 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Moe v. Moe,
676 P.2d 336 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.137(l)(a), (c). Of course, abuse of
discretion is much easier to determine when the judge separates siblings without even considering
the effect of the separation. See, e.g., Wiskoski v. Wiskoski, 629 A.2d 996 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(the question whether siblings should be raised together even required consideration of separating
half brothers or sisters).
13. Stephanie Simon, Years Apart, 14 Find They're All in Family, CHi. TIn., July 6, 1990,
Chicagoland sec. at I.
14. Solano County Superior Court No. J22026; California Court of Appeal No. A058278 (all
citations are from Appellant's Opening Brief, filed November 4, 1992).
15. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4-5, In re Jennifer C. (No. A058278).
16. Id. at 10-12.
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nal grandmother], or the foster parents."' 7 During the Permanency
Planning Hearing, Jennifer testified that she liked her foster parents and
wanted to be adopted by them, but that she also liked living with her
grandmother because she could frequently visit with hjer family. On
cross-examination, however, she said that her real wish was to live with
her natural family which included her four siblings.18 During the perma-
nency planning hearing the parents "repeatedly offered evidence that
would show that the children were bonded to their siblings and grand-
mother, that they would be psychologically harmed if these bonds were
permanently severed, and that their grandmother was willing and able to
be their caretaker." 19
The court ruled that all evidence concerning sibling bonding and
placement with a relative was inadmissible. The court also ruled that
Jennifer could not testify regarding her relationship with her grand-
mother.2 0 The likely result in this case will be that:
Jennifer C., age nine, and Michelle C., age six, will be adopted by a
family in another community in Solano County; and John Jr., age
four and Michael, age three, will be adopted by a family in a third
community in Solano County. Any continued contact among the sib-
lings will be left to the complete discretion of their adoptive
parents.2
3. Living in New York State "where the highest priority is sup-
posed to be given to reuniting siblings," George and Elizabeth Whalen
adopted Michael.22 After a county social worker informed the Whalens
that Michael had an infant sister who needed foster care, the Whalens
stated that they wanted to adopt her also. But the Whalens were never
contacted when the sister was placed into a foster home. After they
contacted a Fulton County social worker to request sibling visitation
between the brother and sister, they were informed "that such visits
would be too difficult because of the distance, even though the Whalens
previously made such drives to visit Michael" prior to his adoption.23
After frequent calls to social workers, the Whalens were informed that
the sister had not been freed for adoption; they found out about her pro-
spective adoption "from an anonymous telephone caller, a woman who
identified herself as a Montgomery County employee .... "24 The
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id. at 15-16.
19. Id. at 18.
20. Id. at 18-19.
21. Id. at 3.
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Whalens went to court to get custody of the sister, or at the least to get
visitation rights for the siblings. The court ruled that the Whalens could
not gain custody of the sister since she had been with the prospective
adoptive couple for over two years, and encouraged, but did not order,
continued visitation between the siblings.
Those are just three illustrations of the tens of thousands of siblings
separated each year through informal hearings where siblings' rights to
associate are seldom formally discussed or argued by independent coun-
sel. The serious due process issues inherent in permanently separating
siblings from one another thus loom large: 1) What is the constitutional
nature of siblings' association rights; 2) Who has the burden of proof
and what is the constitutionally minimal standard of proof; 3) Do sib-
lings have standing or a right to notice, counsel, confrontation, or cross-
examination at such hearings; and 4) Do courts have jurisdiction to order
sibling visitation as a condition of separate adoptive or long-term foster
placements?
25
Siblings have been last in line in receiving legislative and judicial
recognition and protection because until very recently there were no
interest groups or lobbyists advocating their cause. 26 The legal revolu-
tion of family rights in the 1970s focused primarily upon natural par-
ents' due process protection. The early 1980s emphasized foster
parents' issues and a multitude of interest groups managed to gain stand-
ing and a modicum of due process for foster parents. The mid-1980s
and early 1990s focused upon the rights of various third parties, such as
grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins, to maintain continuing relation-
ships with minors after they were temporarily removed from their par-
ents' custody or after parental termination. That movement led to
dozens of statutes creating standing, visitation, and custody preferences
for those third parties.27
Because siblings did not have an organized voice during the devel-
opment of non-parental third party interests, causing siblings to be last
25. In comments to the California Committee on the Judiciary, April 1, 1992, the Capitol
Resource Institute and the Coalition of California Welfare Rights Organizations stated that "the
issue of sibling visitation, something that is a collateral issue in most cases, and in those cases in
which it is addressed, it is dealt with only in a cursory fashion." (on file in the Whittier Law
Library.).
26. One of the first sibling cases to receive public attention was brought by the Children's
Rights Project in the late 1980s. JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A
HISTORY OF ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION 123-124 (1991).
27. By the mid-1980s, 50% of the states had passed grandparent visitation statutes. In 1984,
48 states had grandparent visitation statutes, but only 4 states had separate sibling visitation
statutes. Note, Visitation Beyond the Traditional Limitations, 60 IND. L. REv. 91 (1984); Note,
Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 638 (1984).
See also 25 FAM. L.Q. 1-148 (1991) (special issue on Third-Party custody, visitation, and child
support); CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West 1991).
[Vol. 48:745
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in line, they suffered a tremendous theoretical and jurisprudential price.
Courts and legislatures have merely begun to amend existing statutes to
include siblings among all other third parties having an interest in chil-
dren rather than determining de novo the nature of sibling rights. Courts
and legislatures, without much analysis, have usually determined that
siblings' associational rights are of less value than parent/child rights
and have made those decisions without fully considering the contrary
medical, psychological, and sociological data.2 8 The derivative genesis
of siblings' rights has permitted tens of thousands of brothers and sisters
to be needlessly separated. Courts have not guaranteed these siblings
either substantive or procedural due process, and appellate courts have
merely looked at whether trial judges have abused discretion or statutory
preferences regarding custody decisions.
The danger of merely providing siblings a statutory association
right was recently demonstrated by the hearings on California Assembly
Bill 3332, California's first attempt to statutorily recognize separated
siblings' right to associate.29 The initial bill required visitation for all
siblings separated as a result of child abuse or neglect.30 Assembly Bill
3332 originally stated that "the Legislature declares that it is the policy
of the State of California that it is in the best interest of these children
that they have regular and frequent visitation with their siblings."'" Dur-
ing the Ways and Means Committee hearings, however, as soon as evi-
dence was presented by state attorneys and social service agencies that
visitation would allegedly cost $9,000,000, the bill was amended to
merely require sibling visitation when monitoring by social workers or
probation officers was not necessary.32 "When a child is adjudged to be
28. See infra part IV, for a lengthy discussion of the nature of sibling relationships and the
substantial differences between those bonds and third party bonds.
29. California Assembly Bill 3332 was introduced by California Assemblyman Tom
McClintock on February 20, 1992 as a bill to amend Welfare & Institution Code Section 361.2.
After numerous committee hearings and amendments the bill was signed by the governor on
September 14, 1992. See California-Billtrack; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2.
30. AB 3332 originally stated:
Whenever a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent ... the
court shall order that reasonable sibling visitation be facilitated by the probation
officer. The court shall order reasonable visitation with each of the minor's
siblings, so long as agreed to by the siblings, whether or not the minor's siblings are
dependents of the court, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the sibling visitation would be detrimental to the minor.
See Assembly Bill 3332, Amended in the Assembly April 21 and May 22, 1992 (on file in the
Whittier Law Library).
31. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.2 (g).
32. The County Welfare Directors Association of California opposed the sibling visitation bill
and estimated that it would cost $9,000,000 annually to implement. See Letter from Frank J.
Mecca to Assemblyman McClintock (May 14, 1992) (on file in the Whittier Law Library).
Professor Patton provided the Capitol Resource Institute with economic rebuttal evidence that the
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a dependent of the court, the court shall make a finding, after soliciting
from the child his or her consent for visitation, as to whether a visitation
by siblings unsupervised by a probation officer is appropriate .. .
The policy of the State of California to guarantee sibling visitation
quickly changed to a policy supporting sibling visitation unless it costs
money; such is the ephemeral nature of statutory rights. Several county
social service agencies that opposed the bill stated that they were already
providing the prospectively required sibling visitation.34 Yet, no data
was presented to support such claims, and evidence from the Grand Jury
of San Diego rebutted the counties' claims and stated that it supported
the legislation because of "state-wide past failures" to assure and assist
sibling visitation.35 It is abundantly clear that statutory sibling visitation
will be very limited and will be constantly subject to the economic ax.36
Other statutes will also continue to impede the development of sib-
ling rights. For instance, the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act 37 has had a doubly negative impact on sibling groups.
First, because the goal of permanent and stable placement of children is
the centerpiece of the federal statutory scheme, states have complied by
dramatically shortening the time within which family reunification can
take place prior to parental severance.38 Second, because the federal
bill would cost less than the current $6,000,000 budget because siblings could visit during
currently required court appearances during periodic reviews. Such visits could use already
existing child care\custody facilities and personnel at the dependency court. In addition, the
$9,000,000 figure was inflated because it did not discount the cost of relative-assisted visitation
which would require no state funding. The bill as passed, however, eliminates all monitory
requirements and places the full burden of sibling visitation on caretakers.
33. CAL. Ass. BILL 3332 (emphasis added). For a similar sibling statutory scheme, see In re
H.R., 594 N.Y.S.2d 968, 969 (Fam. Ct. 1993) (discussing N.Y. F'm. CT. Act § 1027-a; N.Y.
Dep't Soc. Servs. Reg., 18 NYCRR § 431.10(a)).
34. See, e.g., Letter from Kathy M. Gallagher, Director of Governmental Relations and
Planning, County of Santa Clara to John Vasconcellos, Chair, Assembly Committee on Ways and
Means (May 18, 1992) (on file in the Whittier Law Library).
35. Letter from Richard B. Macfie, Foreman, Grand Jury County of San Diego to San Diego
County Commission on Children and Youth Legislative Committee (May 11, 1992) (on file in the
Whittier Law Library).
36. "When economic constraints require tradeoffs in a state's budget, children's services are
usually the first to go .... Note, Lashawn A. v. Dixon: Responding to the Pleas of Children, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 529, 531 (1992). It is not sufficient to merely provide that adult siblings
will eventually have an opportunity to locate one another since the importance of the sibling bond
in maturation and social development will already have been lost. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM.
LAW § 5-4A-02; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-139. There are also real "limits to the amount of
reform" that can be realized through federal legislation. Francis Barry McCarthy, The Perils of
Growing Up for Both Children and the Reform Efforts of Child Protection Laws: An Introduction
to the Symposium on Child Protection, 54 UNIv. PITTSBURGH L. REv. 129, 135 (1992).
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 670.
38. For an exhaustive list of state statutory changes, see William Wesley Patton, The World
Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil
and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L. REV. 473, 477 n.16 (1990); see also Alice C.
[Vol. 48:745
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statute assumes that adoption is the preferred model of stable custody for
children separated from their natural parents, many siblings have been
needlessly separated because they could not be quickly adopted as a sib-
ling group. 39 Using adoption as the presumptively best placement, how-
ever, is potentially harmful to displaced children in a number of ways.
First, adoption is an unrealistic expectation which is almost certain
to fail. For instance, in Los Angeles County in 1989 there were 30,000
children in out-of-home placements under the jurisdiction of the Juve-
nile Court; however, fewer than 4% were placed in adoptive homes.4 °
In addition, since states can lose federal funding if they do not imple-
ment the federal mandate to end indeterminate placements of dependent
children in foster homes or guardianships, social workers may find
adoptive homes based upon economic necessity rather than the best
interests of children or sibling groups. By denigrating conditions of
long-term foster care or guardianship, children who are unadoptable or
difficult to place will continue to have their self-esteem lowered rather
than ratified, and prospective guardians and long-term foster parents will
be treated as second-class providers, way stations or warehouses rather
than the best homes for those children under the circumstances. Finally,
if two or more siblings cannot be placed in the same adoptive home, the
presumption of adoption as the best placement will result in brothers and
sisters being split apart into separate placements rather than remaining
together in alternative care.
The easy argument, though an unacceptable response, is that each
child's best interest must be determined without regard to the best inter-
ests of the sibling group.4 t If, for instance, one sibling can be adopted
Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL.
W. L. REv. 223, 227 (1990).
39. During the hearings on the Adoption Assistance Act, Senator Morris Udall stated that its
central goal was that children would "be adopted and lead more stable and happier lives." 1980
126 CONG. REc., H18649 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 14501; see also Cynthia D. v.
Super. Ct., 851 P.2d 1307 (1993).
40. Note, Where Have All The Children Gone?, 21 S.W. L. REV. 125, 146 n.161 (1992)
("[T]he number of yearly adoptions in the U.S. has steadily decreased from a high of 89,200 in
1970 to approximately 50,000 annually over the past few years.") David Herring has recently
argued that a "reasonable efforts" requirement for family reunification often frustrates permanent
placement for children. See David Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in
Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State Child
Welfare System, 54 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 139, 140-41 (1992).
41. See, e.g., Meyer v. Meyer, 663 P.2d 328, 330 (Mont. 1983) (stating that the Montana
statute, § 40-4-212, required a determination of the separate interests of each child, "not the best
interest of the children as a collective"); see also In re Hiatt, 621 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that "the law requires the trial court make an 'independent' determination of
the relevant criteria . . . for each child in a multichild permanent custody proceeding"). In
Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Couch, 832 S.W.2d 265, 266-68 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992), the
appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by separating siblings into
1994]
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into a family which refuses to continue visitation among other siblings,
the court using existing law will likely permit the adoption rather than
select another adoptive family willing to permit visitation or an alterna-
tive group placement where the brothers and sisters could continue their
relationship. If the court determines that continuity of the sibling rela-
tionship is in the best interests of the children, the state should not be
permitted to split the group solely because a prospective adoptive family
expressed a desire to adopt only one or some of the group. The state
should first be forced to demonstrate that, through reasonable efforts, the
group cannot be adopted together and that splitting the group is more in
the best interests of the children than providing stable long-term alterna-
tive care such as a subsidized guardianship or long-term placement with
a relative.
III. DOES ANYONE OUT THERE KNOW How MANY SIBLINGS HAVE
BEEN JUDICIALLY ORDERED INTO SEPARATE PLACEMENTS?
Since the federal government does not maintain or collect statistics
regarding sibling placements outside the home, the authors determined
to cumulate data from the fifty states regarding the demographics of sib-
ling custody. 2 We requested sibling data from each of the various state
social services agencies, and in addition attempted to garner any data
from dozens of private national and local children's organizations.43
Although most agencies and organizations responded, almost none had
any statistical data regarding siblings." Fortunately, however, a few of
different placements even though the Department located two prospective adoptive families
willing to adopt the sibling group. The court did not permit the Department to complete its
investigation because it was afraid that the Department was using the healthy sibling "as an
inducement to get someone to adopt Misty [a handicapped sister] and that Misty would be better
off with someone who was willing to accept her alone in light of her special needs." Id. This case
is particularly troubling because of the court's rank speculation about the Department's motives
and because the siblings were not given independent counsel to argue the case; the same guardian
ad litem represented both girls even though there was an obvious conflict of interest. But see In re
M., 416 N.E. 2d 669, 672-74 (Ohio Misc. Ct. 1979) (rejecting a separation of siblings into
different adoptive homes).
42. See supra note 2.
43. A representative sample of the agencies we contacted includes such organizations as:
Casey Family Services in Hartford, Connecticut; Children Now in San Francisco; National
Resource Center On Child Sexual Abuse; National Center For Missing & Exploited Children,
Arlington, Virginia; Utah Chapter of the National Committee for Prevention of Child Abuse;
National Association of Counsel for Children, Denver, Colorado; National Council of Juvenile
and Family Court Judges, University of Nevada; National Center for Youth Law, San Francisco;
American Prosecutors Research Institute (National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse),
Alexandria, Virginia; Federation on Child Abuse & Neglect, Albany, N.Y.; and the National
Foster Care Resource Center, Eastern Michigan University.
44. For example, Richard L. Winters of the State of Washington Department of Social and
Health Services, responded, "As you are probably aware by now, most states, including
Washington, do not separately compile data on sibling placements and track that information to
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the jurisdictions, which had the greatest foster care populations, pro-
vided us with sufficient sibling information from which a reasonably
extrapolated, national sibling placement picture could be drawn. In
addition, because California, which has the greatest foster care popula-
tion in the country, does not keep sibling placement records,45 we have
received permission to access the computer records in the California
Foster Care Information System and have compiled data regarding sib-
ling placement in that state.46 In order to compare jurisdictions we have
included the state data for the year 1990, the last complete data compiled
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. We
have also included information supplied by agencies and independent
organizations, when available, for 1991 and 1992. The following charts
summarize the sibling data we have been able to compile; the data and
sources for these statistics are presented in the Appendix.
determine outcomes." Letter to Professor Patton (Sept. 8, 1992) (on file with the author). Carolyn
Godinez, Management Analyst, Kansas Department of Social And Rehabilitative Services Youth
And Adult Services, stated, "I regret to inform you that Kansas ... does not currently gather data
specifically relating to sibling issues." Letter to Professor Patton (Sept. 9, 1992) (on file with the
author). Similar responses were received from many other state agencies.
45. The House Select Committee On Children, Youth, and Families, H.R. REP. No. 395,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990), estimated that one-fifth of the 500,000 out-of-home placed
children live in California. In California more children enter the system than exit. For example,
in 1989 2,584 more children entered than left court supervision. INTER-AGENCY COUNCIL ON
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, DATA ANALYSIS REPORT FOR 1990, at 3 (1990) [hereinafter ICAN].
The average number of dependent children supervised by the Los Angeles Superior Court was
7,296 in 1975, 11,325 in 1979, 18,385 in 1983, and 21,722 in 1985. Los ANGELES ROUNDTABLE
FOR CHILDREN, THE CHILDREN'S BUDGET OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY GOVERNMENT 1 (May, 1986).
In 1989 there were 30,000 children under dependency jurisdiction in Los Angeles. COUNTY OF
L.A. DEP'T OF CHILDREN'S SERVS., 1987-89 BIENNIAL REPORT; Where Have All The Children
Gone, supra note 40, at 146 n.161.
46. We wish to thank Connie Hudson, California Department of Social Services, Chief of
Foster Care Information Systems, and Ray Bacon, state computer programmer, for their help in
compiling the California sibling data.
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We wondered whether the early sibling studies conducted from the
1960s through the early 1980s were accurate since most involved very
small empirical samples. We focused on two of the largest foster place-
ment populations in America, Los Angeles and New York, as well as

































A. Percentage of Foster Children with Siblings Also in
Out-of-Home Care47
The early sibling studies estimated that "between 56% and 85% of
children in care also have siblings in care."' 48 Our results demonstrate
that the earlier estimates were fairly accurate. For instance, in California
between August 9, 1990 and November 8, 1991, siblings comprised
between 56.4% and 58.9% of children in out-of-home placements. In
Illinois the 1992 placement figures demonstrate that 62.4% of out-of-
home placements involved siblings. Kentucky had the lowest percent-
age of siblings in 1991, 31%. The percentage of New York siblings
increased from approximately 50% in 1980-1981 to almost 70% in
1990. Although our data represents reports from only a few jurisdic-
tions, the cumulative total of foster placements in those reported states
constitutes a large percentage of the United States foster children popu-
lation. It is therefore relatively safe to state that the percentage of sib-
lings in out-of-home care in the early 1990s is approximately 50% to
60% of all foster placements, although individual state's sibling statis-
tics may vary from 30% to 70%. Based upon the figure of 500,000
children in substitute care nationally, between 250,000 to 300,000 sib-
lings are currently placed outside their parental homes through the child
dependency system.49
B. Percentage of Siblings Separated into Different Placements
Early studies indicated that "75% of the siblings in foster care were
not placed together."' 0 Assuming that the earlier data was accurate, our
research demonstrates that a smaller percentage of siblings are being
separated during the early 1990s. The percentage of separated siblings,
however, is still very high, especially in light of the 1980s focus on
reunification services for these "hard to place" children.
For instance, in California between August 9, 1990 and November
8, 1991, the percentage of siblings separated into different homes ranged
from 40% (19,016 out of 47,337 siblings) to 56% (26,464 out of
47,098). The Illinois statistics were comparable; 41% (3,509 out of
8,601) of siblings were separated. In 1991, New York separated 40%
(3,859 out of 9,687) of siblings. The total sibling placement population
47. Unless otherwise indicated, the state statistics quoted here are the same data presented
under the individual discussions of each state's children's placements, supra part III.
48. Margaret Ward, Sibling Ties in Foster Care and Adoption Planning, 63 CHILD WELFARE
321, 323 (1984).
49. This estimate, of course, does not include children voluntarily placed outside their home,
homeless children living on the streets, runaway children, or undocumented children.
50. LE PEaRE ET AL., LARGE SIBLING GROUPS: ADOPTION EXPERIENCES 29 (Child Welfare
League of America, 1986).
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in New York on December 31, 1991 included 23,989 separated siblings,
or 57% (23,989 out of 42,204).
Therefore, if we accept 41% as the state median of out-of-home
sibling placements in which siblings are separated into different custody
arrangements, there are approximately 28,000 to 34,000 siblings sepa-
rated each year nationally."
C. Relationship Between Initial Sibling Placement, Reunification,
and Adoptive Placement
Research over the past several decades has consistently demon-
strated that the longer siblings remain separated in out-of-home place-
ments, the less likely they will ever be reunited with their birth family or
with the same adoptive family.52 "If children are initially separated in
foster care, it increases the chances of their not being placed together in
adoption. ' 53 Current research continues to support the importance of the
initial sibling placement in determining whether siblings will ever be
reunited. A recent study of adoption placements at Casey Family Serv-
ices in New England demonstrated that: 1) "[m]ost of the siblings [ini-
tially] placed together remain together throughout their placement
history."; 2) "no [sibling] pair initially separate was ever brought
together later"; and 3) if a sibling pair initially placed together was dis-
rupted, "only 38% of the decisions made were to keep siblings together
in a new placement.
54
Unfortunately, there is even less national data on sibling adoptions
than on sibling foster placements. Our research provided the following
additional information:
51. The number of separated siblings was derived from the following data: 1) There were
2,712,917 children reported abused in 1990. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM: WORKING PAPER 1, 1990 SUMMARY DATA
COMPONENT 8 (April, 1992) (DHHS Pub. No. (ACF) 92-30361). Of those reports approximately
484,167 were substantiated. Id. at 11. In the 33 states reporting, 73,860 of those children were
removed from their homes. Id. at 17. If we add the number of children removed in New York,
19,856, and the number of California children removed from home, 14,772, there were 113,493
children removed from those 35 states. See supra chart I. If we conservatively add 2,000
removed children from each of the 15 nonreporting jurisdiction (the median for the 35 reporting
jurisdictions was 3,242), then there were 143,493 children nationally removed from their home
due to child abuse or neglect. Since our research has demonstrated that between 50% to 60% of
children in foster care are siblings, approximately 71,747 to 86,906 siblings were placed in out-of-
home care during 1990. See supra chart II. If, as our research demonstrated approximately 40%
of out-of-home placed siblings are separated, then in 1990 nationally approximately 28,699 to
34,762 were split apart into different facilities.
52. Ward, supra note 48, at 324.
53. LE PERE ET AL., supra note 50, at 29.
54. Ilene Staff et al., Siblings in Foster Care, Excerpts from remarks made at the presentation
of the Child Welfare League of America's North Atlantic Regional Conference 2-3, June 3, 1991
(Prepared for Professor Patton on July 7, 1992) (on file in the Whittier Law Library).
[Vol. 48:745
SIBLINGS' ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
A. Alabama, which substantiated 16,009 cases of child abuse in
1990, only placed 37 sibling groups for adoption in 1992. Since we
were unable to obtain facts on the number of siblings in Alabama in out-
of-home care or information on the percentage of abused siblings legally
freed for adoption, it is impossible to intelligently interpret the data.
Nevertheless, if the national median of siblings in foster care is approxi-
mately 50%-60%, then in Alabama in 1990 between 8004 and 9605 sib-
lings were placed in substitute care. One would expect many more than
37 sibling groups legally freed and available for adoption out of that
many out-of-home siblings. Therefore, the percentage of sibling group
adoption appears quite meager.
B. California, which had 67,687 children in foster care on April
1989, placed very few children for adoption that year: 3,113 children
were placed in adoptive homes; 2,651 adoptions were completed; and
3,141 children were legally freed awaiting adoptive placement." Since
California does not maintain separate information on sibling groups sep-
arated for adoption, it is difficult to draw conclusions. Only a small
proportion of California children legally free for adoption are recom-
mended for adoption after an adoptability assessment. For example,
only 39% (4,854 out Of 12,322) of referrals in 1989 were for adoption.
56
The California statistics provide additional support for the unrealistic
goal of using adoption as the presumptive alternative to living with
one's natural family. Failures will out number successes. More children
will be rejected from than accepted into adoptive families after the
extensive administrative and judicial interviews, hearings and reviews.
C. In Hawaii in 1991:
There were 320 sibling groups identified in substitute care, involving
821 children in placement. Sixty-one sibling groups had at least one
child with an adoption goal. Seven sibling groups had at least one
child with an adoption goal and at least one other child with a goal
other than adoption (i.e., reunification and permanent substitute
care).
57
These statistics indicate that only a small percentage of sibling groups in
Hawaii have the same adoptive home as the primary permanency plan.
D. Massachusetts has had the most ambitious and successful sib-
ling adoption and long-term placement plan that we have discovered. In
1991, 49% of the children adopted were members of siblings groups and
55. CAL. DEP'T SOCIAL SERVS. ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA: RELINQUISHMENT, INDEPENDENT,
INTERCOUNTRY, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT JULY 1988 - JUNE 1989, table I (ADOP 2-1989-1).
56. Id. at Table 6.
57. Letter from Ricky Higashide, State Of Hawaii Department Of Human Service Planning
Office, to Professor Patton (September 15, 1992) (on file with the author).
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those adoptions increased by 8% over 1990.58 The Massachusetts suc-
cess may be a direct result of using a substantial portion, 29%, of their
adoption subsidy budget to place sibling groups together in adoptive
homes.59 Generous adoption subsidies have long been determined to be
a dramatic stimulus to increasing the number of sibling group
adoptions.6°
Massachusetts more than any other state has attempted to keep non-
adopted sibling groups together. In Fiscal Year 1991, "103 children in
41 sibling groups received guardianships.' Since Massachusetts rec-
ognizes that "[p]roviding care and medical attention can be a huge bur-
den for . . . guardians of special needs children," they provided
guardianship subsidies to 67% of the guardianships granted in 1991.62
E. South Carolina, which has approximately 1,800 children a year
placed in out-of-home substitute care, has had very few sibling group
placements. In 1991 40 sibling groups were adopted, and in 1992, 42
sibling groups were adopted.
63
The first out-of-home placement is the most critical for siblings. If
separated, they rarely are reunited. The dependency courts and trial
counsel focus during the early stages of dependency proceedings on
good, safe care for siblings and rarely consider the long-term impact on
severing sibling bonds. Therefore, a custody decision temporarily split-
ting siblings which is seen as merely a footprint in the sand is likely to
become cast in concrete.
IV. SIBLING BONDS
Uncodified by law, uncelebrated by religious ritual, and unac-
knowledged by rights of passage, siblings bonds have been largely
ignored by both legal and mental health literature." Perhaps the signifi-
cance of sibling relationships is so evident as a matter of common sense
58. Richard Mo, Assistant Commissioner, Office For Policy and Program, Profiles of
Children Adopted and Children Who Received Guardianships During FY'91, 3 (The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office of Health And Human Services Department
of Social Services).
59. Id. at 7.
60. Ward, supra note 48, at 324; LE PEa ET AL., supra note 50, at 37, 42, 47.
61. Mo, supra note 58, at 6.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Letter from Eddie Bogan, Assistant Director Division of Adoption and Birth Parent
Services, Office of Human Services and Self Sufficiency, South Carolina Department of Social
Services, to Professor Patton (September 25, 1992) (on file with the author).
64. STEPHEN P. BANK & MICHAEL D. KAHN, THE SIBLING BOND: THE FIRST MAJOR
ACCOUNT OF THE POWERFUL EMOTIONAL CONNECTIONS AMONG BROTHERS AND SISTERS
THROUGHOUT LIFE (1975). Sibling Placement has received little attention in child welfare
literature. See Staff& Fein, Together or Separate: A Study of Siblings in Foster Care, 71 CHILD
WELFARE 257-70, 258 (1993).
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that it needs no documentation. After all, in Europe and the United
States, 80% of children have siblings.65 Brothers and sisters spend more
time together and have longer relationships with one another than chil-
dren have with their parents.66 A sibling may be more likely than any
other friend or relative to be present at one's death bed.
Historically, sibling relationships have received relatively little aca-
demic attention. Child development literature, for example, deals almost
exclusively with parental influence, perhaps reflecting the importance of
mother-infant bonding in classical psychoanalytic theory.67 Family ther-
apy' s 6 emphasis on reciprocal social influences focused on group rather
than interpersonal dynamics and as a result did little to further the under-
standing of sibling bonds. 69 Empirical studies of attachment, psychoan-
alytic theory, and social science research all describe some sibling
features. For example, early social science studies hoped to characterize
siblings through statistical analysis of family structure by discerning
relationships between birth order and personality characteristics. 7° The
complexity of interrelating factors, both within families and without,
that contribute to individual development limited the utility of this
research. Only recently have there been studies that focus directly on
sibling bonds, and these studies offer incontrovertible evidence of such
bonds' developmental importance and the significant influence they
exert throughout adult life.71
Attachment research offers a rich empirical basis for evaluating the
nature and importance of bonding. Attachment describes an enduring
emotional bond manifest by efforts to be in close proximity, especially
at times of stress. The evolutionary view of attachment understands it as
65. J. Dunn, Sibling Relationships in Early Childhood, 54 CHILD DEV. 787-811 (1983).
66. T.H. POWELL & P.A. OGLE, BROTHERS AND SISTERS: A SPECIAL PART OF EXCEPTIONAL
FAMILIES (1985).
67. Ainsworth, M.D.S., The Development of Infant-Mother Attachment, 3 REV. CHILD DEV.
RESEARCH 1-94 (B.M. Caldwell & H. Ricciuti eds. 1973); J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS.
VOL. 1: ATTACHMENT (1969); J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973); S. FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1940).
68. IRENE GOLDENBERG & HERBERT GOLDENBERG, FAMILY THERAPY: AN OVERVIEW (1985).
69. BANK & KAHN, supra note 64.
70. These are often referred to as "constellation studies," so named because they purport to
measure structural influences. A. Lawson & J.D. Ingelby, Daily Routines of Preschool Children:
Effects of Age, Birth Order, Sex and Social Class and Developmental Correlates, 4
PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE 399-415 (1974); J. DUNN & C. KENDRICK, SIBLINGS: LOVE, ENVY,
AND UNDERSTANDING (1982); R.B. Zajonc & G.B. Markus, Birth Order and Intellectual
Development, 82 PSYCHOL. REV. 74-88 (1975).
71. GALLAGHER & POWELL, BROTHERS AND SISTERS: A SPECIAL PART OF EXCEPTIONAL
FAMILIES (1985); Furman & Buhrmeister, Children's Perceptions of the Quality of Sibling
Relationships, 56 CHILD DEV. 448-61 (1985); D. Lobato et al., Examining the Effects of Chronic
Disease and Disability on Children's Sibling Relationships, 13 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 389-407
(1988).
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a biologically-based behavior that furthers species survival by protecting
and nurturing the young.72 Historically, Freudian theory viewed mother-
infant bonding as a mere correlate of basic needs provision, a notion that
was reformulated by learning theorists in behavior reinforcement
terms.7 3 Subsequent research has proved, however, that the human need
for emotional connection is independent of other biological impera-
tives. 74 Developmental psychology posits early attachment as the foun-
dation of self-concept, basic trust in relationships, and adaptivity
throughout adult life.75
Contemporary psychoanalytic theory expands on this empirical
research and conceptualizes an early life process through which images
of the self and others are internalized, creating a psychological template
for the formation of all subsequent relationships.76 Accordingly, the
search for secure emotional relationships becomes a central goal of early
development, and the extent to which a child achieves this goal theoreti-
cally determines such individual characteristics as self-esteem and
capacity for intimacy. Psychoanalytic descriptions of this process have
emphasized childhood longings for idealized, strong parental figures
capable of "mirroring" responsiveness. 77  Current psychoanalytic
thought is formulating new paradigms of attachment. This work empha-
sizes the importance of caregivers' affective responsiveness to their chil-
dren and describes new co-created patterns of organizing experience.78
72. R.A. Thompson, Attachment Theory and Research, in CHILD AND ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 100-08 (Martin Lewis ed. 1991).
73. FREUD, supra note 67.
74. H.F. Harlow, The Nature of Love, 13 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 673-85 (1958) (rhesus
infants chose terry cloth wire surrogate over bare wire surrogate with food); R.A. Spitz,
Hospitalism: An Inquiry Into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood, I
PSYCHOANAL STUDY CHILD 53-74 (1945) (failure to thrive in orphans not held except for feeding
and deprived of consistent caregiver).
75. I. Bretherton, Open Communication and Internal Working Models: Their Role in
Development of Attachment Relationships, in 36 SOCIOEMOTONAL DEVELOPMENT (R.A.
Thompson ed. 1990); M. Main et al., Security in Infancy, Childhood and Adulthood: A Move to
the Level of Representation, in GROWING POINTS IN ATTACHMENT THEORY AND RESEARCH 66-104
(I. Bretherton & E. Waters eds. 1985) (Monographs of the Society for Research in Child
Development); L.A. Sroufe & J. Fleeson, Attachment and the Construction of Relationships, in
RELATIONSHIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (W.W. Hartup & Z. Rubin eds. 1986).
76. BOWLBY, supra note 67; J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss. VOL. 2: SEPARATION
(1973); B. Beebe & F.M. Lachmann, Reformulations of Early Development and Transference:
Implications for Psychic Structure Formation, in INTERFACE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
PSYCHOLOGY (J.W. Barron et al. eds. 1992); H. KOHUT, THE RESTORATION OF THE SELF (1977);
D. STERN, THE INTERPERSONAL WORLD OF THE INFANT (1985).
77. The self psychology movement, led by Heinz Kohut, has had a major influence on
modem concepts of bonding. See J.L. Trop, Recent Developments in Self-Psychology, 7 CURRENT
OPINIONS IN PSYCHIATRY 225-28 (1994).
78. Intersubjective theory represents an important new model for understanding the process
through which meanings are ascribed to experience in relationships. See Beebe & Lachmann,
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Thus, for contemporary psychoanalytic theory, the sibling bond devel-
ops in a cooperative, interactive process under the influence of parental
values and preferences.
Early empirical studies of attachment asserted that parent-child
bond quality during the first year determined future mental health.7 9
Subsequent work has questioned the determinative power of early child-
hood experiences with one primary caretaker;80 attachment research
today reflects a new understanding of the complicated and interrelated
determinants of adaptive and maladaptive behavior. Many important
factors have been identified, including quality of care during infancy,
father involvement, satisfaction in the marital relationship, socioeco-
nomic status, infant temperament, and environmental stress.8
As a consequence, the developmental importance of alternative
relationships has grown. Many studies find consistency in caregiving
conditions over time to be a more important determinant of psychologi-
cal functioning than the parent-child bond alone.8" Psychological adap-
tation appears to be shaped by a totality of circumstances, not only by
maternal care during the first year, as had been originally assumed.
While this view limits the deterministic claims of early attachment
research, it suggests the potential for therapeutic intervention in dysfunc-
tional families and the larger social settings of which they are a part.83
Attachment research enhances our appreciation for the importance
of sibling bonds. While evaluating the quality and number of important
attachments cannot predict a child's future psychopathology, it can help
to identify aspects of the modem family most likely to provide caregiv-
ing consistency. If children of all ages can make attachments to multiple
caregivers, many more resources may be available to foster child devel-
opment than courts now acknowledge. 84 Among these, sibling relation-
supra note 77; J.L. Trop & R.P. Stolorow, A Developmental Perspective on Analytic Empathy: A
Case Study, 19 J. Am. ACAD. PSYCHOANALYSIS 31-46 (1991).
79. M.E. LAMB ET AL., INFANT-MOTHER ATTACHMENT (1985); M.E. Lamb et al., Security of
Infantile Attachment as Assessed in the "Strange Situation": Its Study and Biological
Interpretation, 7 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 127-47 (1984).
80. M.F. Erickson et al., The Relationship Between Quality of Attachment and Behavior
Problems in Preschool in a High-Risk Sample, in GROWING POINTS IN ATTACHMENT THEORY AND
RESEARCH 147-66 (1. Bretherton & E. Waters eds. 1985) (Monographs of the Society for Research
in Child Development); R.A. Hinde, Attachment: Some Conceptual and Biological Issues, in THE
PLACE OF ATTACHMENT IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 60-76 (J. Stevenson-Hinde & C. Murray Parkes
eds. 1982).
81. LAMB ET AL., supra note 79.
82. LAMB ET AL., supra note 79; Lamb et al., supra note 79; R.A. Thompson & M.E. Lamb,
Infant-Parent Attachment: New Directions for Theory and Research, in 7 LIFE-SPAN
DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 1-41 (P.B. Baltes et al. eds. 1986).
83. Thompson, supra note 72, at 104.
84. Sibling relationships have been shown to compensate for inadequate parenting. M. Eno,
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ships are perhaps the most important and the least recognized."3
What can we understand about siblings from reviewing scientific
research? The natural scientist views the sibling bond as a unique
genetic relationship, one that represents the closest of all biological
bonds.8 6 Genetic principles underlying biological similarity have pro-
vided a scientific basis for comparing environmental and inborn influ-
ences on development through multigenerational family research, as in
longitudinal twin studies.
8 7
Although early social science research assumes a hierarchical fam-
ily structure increasingly rare today, this work has general descriptive
value and can suggest some factors relevant to understanding sibling
relationships.88 Gender studies offer especially interesting observations.
These studies note significant differences in the way sisters and brothers
structure relationships.89  Girls are more influenced by siblings, more
nurturing with younger siblings, and more likely to view themselves as
caretakers than boys. 90 In contrast to these findings, there are no gender
differences associated with imitation, pro-social behavior, and aggres-
sion, over time.9' Other aspects of interactive style (e.g., "solidarity")
appear to be associated with a particular developmental stage rather than
Sibling Relationships in Failures of Divorce, in DIVORCE THERAPY 139-56 (1985); LAMB ET AL.,
supra note 79; R.A. Thompson, Fathers and the Child's "Best Interests": Judicial Decision-
Making in Custody Disputes, in THE FATHER'S ROLE: APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 61-102 (M.E. Lamb
ed. 1986); E. Waters & D.M. Noyes, Psychological Parenting vs. Attachment Theory: The
Child's Best Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right Things for the Wrong Reasons, 12 REV.
LAW SOC. CHANGE 505-15 (1984).
85. Judicial efforts to identify the "psychological parent" in child custody determinations
show the influence of attachment theory in elaborating the best interest of the child. A. Goetting,
The Developmental Tasks of Siblingship Over the Life Cycle, 48 J. AM. FAM. 703-14 (1986); W.
Nichols, Sibling Subsystem Therapy in Family System Reorganization, 9 J. OF DIVORCE 13-31
(Spring 1986); B. Waters, Sibling Relationships in Separated Families, 8 J. FAM. THERAPY 13-17;
Waters & Noyes, supra note 84.
86. Siblings can be biologically identical, of course, as in the case of twins.
87. Twin research has helped to identify environmental and genetic contributions to infantile
autism, alcoholism, schizophrenia, and many other psychiatric disorders. See BANK & KAHN,
supra note 64, at 5, 22-23, 253.
88. DUNN & KENDRICK, supra note 70; B.S. Jacobs & H.A. Moss, Birth Order and Sex of
Sibling as Determinants of Mother-Child Interaction, 47 CHILD DEV. 315-22 (1976); H.L. Koch,
Some Personality Correlates of Sex, Sibling Position, and Sex of Siblings Among 5- and 6-Year-
Old Children, 52 GENETIC PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 3-50 (1955); A.M. Minnett et al., The Effects
of Sibling Status on Sibling Interaction: Influence of Birth Order, Age Spacing, Sex of Child, and
Sex of Sibling, 54 CHILD DEV. 1064-72 (1983); B.G. Rosenberg, Life Span Personality Stability in
Sibling Status, in SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS: THEIR NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE ACROSS THE
LIFESPAN 167-224 (M.E. Lamb & B. Sutton-Smith eds. 1982); Zajonc & Markus, supra note 70,
at 74-88.
89. R. Abramovitch et al., Sibling Interaction in the Home, 50 CHILD DEV. 997-1003 (1979).
90. Id.; J.H.S. BOSSARD & E.H. BOLL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT (3rd ed.
1960); B. SUTTON-SMITH & B.G. ROSENBERG, THE SIBLING (1970).
91. DuNN & KENDRICK, supra note 70.
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gender.92 First bors are thought to be more intelligent, verbal, and
dominant than younger siblings, who have better social skills. Close
age-spacing has been linked to more intimacy and conflict between sib-
lings, especially if they are of the same sex.93 Conflicting results have,
however, limited the general usefulness of research on gender effects.94
Recent research acknowledges the importance of sibling bonds to
individual and family functioning.95 These studies have characterized
d7velopmental aspects of the sibling relationship as well as the impact of
environmental influences on the individual, sibling pair, and family.
96
Using new methodological approaches that draw on individual report
and direct observation, rather than statistical analysis alone, these studies
acknowledge variations in subjective experience and cultural
influence. 97
Modem concepts of family functioning that feature developmental
process and reciprocal influences provide a new dynamic context in
which to study siblings.98 As a result, sibling relationships, the family
of which they are a part, and even the larger cultural context can be
appreciated as factors that influence and are influenced by each other.99
New models of family functioning provide a setting in which questions
about the quality of family relationships can be posed. Why are some
sibling bonds healthy and others detrimental? What features of sibling
bonds might serve protective functions at times of family stress? What
harms, if any, result from the loss of sibling contact? Without under-
92. BANK & KAHN, supra note 64, at 339.
93. See BANK & KAHNIN, supra note 64, at 9 (concept of "high access" siblings); B.K. Bryant,
Sibling Relationships in Middle Childhood, in SIBLING RELATIONSHIPS 87-122 (M.E. Lamb & B.
Sutton-Smith eds. 1982); H.L. Koch, The Relation of "Primary Mental Abilities" in 5- and 6-
Year-Olds to Sex of Child and Characteristics of His Sibling, 25 CHILD DEV. 209-310 (1954);
H.L. Koch, Children's Work Attitudes and Sibling Characteristics, 27 CHILD DEV. 289-310
(1956).
94. Compare SuTTON-SMITH & ROSENBERG, supra note 91 and Abramovitch et al., supra
note 90 with DUNN & KENDRICK, supra note 70.
95. S.B. CAMPBELL, BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS IN PRESCHOOL: CLINICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
ISSUES 121-140 (1990); Dunn, supra note 65, at 787-811; P.A. Gallagher & T.H. Powell,
Brothers and Sisters: Meeting Special Needs, in Topics IN EARLY CHILDHOOD. FAMILIES IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION 24-37 (1989); K. Lewis, Sibling Therapy with Multiproblem Families, 12 J.
MARITAL AND FAM. THERAPY 291-300 (1986); J. Wishart, Siblings as Models in Early Infant
Learning, 57 CHILD DEV. 1232-40, 1247 (1986).
96. BANK & KAHN, supra note 64; W. Furman & D. Buhrmeister, Children's Perceptions of
the Qualities of Sibling Relationships, 56 CHILD DEV. 448-61 (1985); Gallagher & Powell, supra
note 96, at 24-37; D. Lobato et at., Examining the Effects of Chronic Disease and Disability on
Children's Sibling Relationships, 13 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 389-407 (1988).
97. Furman & Buhrmeister, supra note 96, at 448-61. Gallagher & Powell, supra note 96, at
24-37.
98. K. Nihira et al., Home Environment, Family Adjustment, and the Development of Mentally
Retarded Children, I APPLIED RESEARCH IN MENTAL RETARDATION 5-24 (1980).
99. Furman & Buhrmeister, supra note 96; Lobato et al., supra note 71.
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standing the bonding process, the impact of environment and the influ-
ence of sibling relationships on individual and family, research can
contribute little to meaningful therapeutic intervention or enlightened
social policy.
In their 1982 publication, The Sibling Bond, Bank and Kahn intro-
duced a new qualitative approach to understanding sibling bonds."°
Their clinical research characterizes emotional bonds between brothers
and sisters, identifying detriments and benefits. They conclude that sib-
ling bonds are influenced by the degree of "access" between siblings
(defined as how near in age and how involved with one another's lives
they are), the level of anxiety in the early mother-child attachment, and
the availability of auxiliary parenting resources.'O°
For Bank and Kahn, both extrinsic and developmental factors are
influential where sibling bonds are concerned. Extrinsic factors such as
divorce and remarriage influence the sibling relationship in complex
ways; the number of parenting figures may increase while many children
receive significantly less parenting. Through this process, nonparental
relationships, including sibling relationships, become more important.'
0 2
In early childhood, where the need for parental involvement is great, the
effects of deficient parenting can produce sibling bonds of unusual
intensity in later life. The diversion of parental energies during other
stages of development, such as adolescence, where peer relationships
have assumed primary importance, may have less impact on sibling rela-
tionships. Whatever the developmental stage or degree of parental
availability, a sibling who has been influential in a child's early develop-
ment becomes a part of that child's forming identity.'
0 3
Psychological research shows the sibling bond follows a predict-
able developmental course that is related to stages in the family life
cycle. 10 4 During preschool years, siblings are often constant compan-
ions whose interactions (along with differential treatment by parents)
shape intellectual and personality development.' At this age, siblings
function as socializing agents for each other. They practice social inter-
100. BANK & KAHN, supra note 64, at 37, 141.
101. Id. at 37, 141.
102. Eno, supra note 84, at 139-56.
103. BANK & KAHN, supra note 64.
104. Id. at 64. The family "life cycle" is a construct developed by family therapists that
applies developmental principles to the family and its subsystems. GOLDENBERG & GOLDENBERG,
supra note 68.
105. See Dr. Laurie Eisenberg's valuable and exhaustive review of the psychology literature in
her doctoral dissertation, The Psychological Adjustment of Siblings of Placed and Non-Placed
Severely Handicapped Children (1993) (Ph.D dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles).




actions by playing different roles and in this manner develop a funda-
mental approach to learning. 10 6 Later during school years, siblings take
different roles within the family and extend familial social skills to non-
family members. Adolescents often turn to siblings for counsel, despite
growing ambivalence toward the family.'0 7
As a primary socializing relationship, the sibling bond provides an
important context for moral development. Piaget identified the capacity
to appreciate competing interests, consensus, and interpersonal coopera-
tion as critical components of the child's development of moral reason-
ing.' 0 8 Kohlberg's notion of moral judgment also posits mutuality in
relationships as essential to moral behavior based on internalization of
norms. 10 9 The important role of empathy in the development of
prosocial behavior has been described by many, including sibling
researchers, who found that siblings as young as 18 months could
engage in fantasy play with older siblings involving the feelings of
others. " 0
The importance of associational ties to moral life is perhaps set out
most clearly by moral philosopher, John Rawls. 1" He characterizes the
morality of early life as a morality of authority, in which the child obeys
out of fear that he would otherwise be punished by someone he
adores." 2 This first stage of morality does not depend on a child's
understanding of justification for rules, but on the value of the relation-
ship to the child. Morality of association, a later development, is based
on an appreciation of our social nature, a product of our innate capacity
for fellow feeling. 1 3 The inborn wish for ongoing social connection
helps to manage destructive impulses, and this process is critically
dependent on associational ties. The internalization of norms essential
to moral development is, therefore, a function of meaningful ongoing
interpersonal association.
For Rawls, attachment is more than fulfillment of a biological
or psychological imperative, it is the foundation of moral society. And
106. POWELL & OGLE, supra note 66; Lobato et al., supra note 71.
107. See Goetting, supra note 85.
108. J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGEMENT OF THE CHILD (1932); J. PIAGET & B. INHELDER, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CHILD (1969).
109. A. Colby et al., A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgement, in 48 MONOGRAPHS OF THE
SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT (1983); A. COLBY ET AL., 2 THE MEASUREMENT
OF MORAL JUDGEMENT (1987).
110. J. Dunn, Understanding Feelings. The Early Stages, in MAKING SENSE: THE CHILD'S
CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD 26 (J. Bruner & H. Haste eds. 1987); A. FREUD, NORMALITY AND
PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD (1966).
111. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 395-577 (1971).
112. Id. at 462.
113. Id. at 467.
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this, ultimately, explains the legal stake in preserving sibling
relationships.
V. Do SIBLINGS HAVE A CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED
RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE?
No supreme court has determined whether siblings have a constitu-
tional right to associate with one another.'1 4 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has seldom determined any issues involving juveniles'
substantive or procedural due process protection outside the area of
juvenile delinquency and education. It is unnecessary to rehearse here
the specific holdings of In re Gault, II In re Winship, 1 6 and McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania,"7 other than to note that the Supreme Court does not
require juveniles in delinquency proceedings to receive due process pro-
tection identical to that afforded to adult criminal defendants.'1 8 Since
children cannot vote or donate to political campaigns, legislatures have
historically refused to seriously determine their specific rights or
respond adequately to their individual needs.1 19
114. "The existence of a constitutionally protected associational interest between siblings is an
open question." Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 536 F. Supp. 462, 468 (E.D. Wis. 1982), overruled by
746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984). In 1974 there was "no court to date which recognizes a natural
right of siblings to associate with one another." W. Homer Reddick, Sibling Rights in Legal
Decisions Affecting Children, 25 Juv. JUST. 31, 32 (1974). A few appellate courts, however, are
beginning to recognize a constitutional right of siblings to associate. See, e.g., L. v. G., 497 A.2d
215, 222 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) ("[T]his Court finds that siblings possess the natural,
inherent and inalienable right to visit with each other.").
115. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
116. 97 U.S. 358 (1970).
117. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
118. For an extended analysis of the genesis of juvenile delinquent's due process rights, see
Francis B. McCarthy, Preadjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. (1981). The Court has articulated at least three reasons why
children's rights are not consonant with adults' rights: I) children are particularly vulnerable; 2)
children are incapable of making "decisions in an informed, mature manner"; and 3) recognizing
children as equal would dramatically frustrate parents' rights to rear their children. Belloti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). "The State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of
its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair
their ability to exercise their rights wisely." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2942 (1990).
"There are five key elements in fully informed decision-making. These include: information,
understanding, competency, voluntariness, and decision-making ability (i.e., reasoning)." Gerald
Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives On Children's Rights, NOVA L. REv. 711
(1992); Eugeen Verhellen, Changes in the Images of the Child, in MICHAEL FREEMAN & PHILIP
VEERMAN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 81 (1992). For an analysis of children's
inequality under the law, see Steven Hobbs & Mary Mulligan, Centrist Judging and Traditional
Family Values: Or Why Papa Can't Be a Rolling Stone, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 345, 347-49
(1992). "Although the Supreme Court has said that children are possessed of fundamental rights
that the state must respect, it is not clear what rights these are and whether, and in what situations,
these rights preempt parental rights." David Elkind, The Law and Postmodern Perceptions of
Children and Youth, 69 DENY. U. L. REv. 575, 579 (1992).
119. Lynn Stout has recently argued that a fundamental rights approach to infringements on
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A. Theoretical Underpinnings of Parental Rights
It should not surprise anyone that the Supreme Court has left the
nature of children's rights undefined as the Court has been unable to
agree on the political/philosophical basis of parents' rights. Therefore,
before articulating the nature of siblings' rights, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the Court's jurisprudence regarding the parent/child rela-
tionship should be applied to siblings. Is a parent's right to rear a child
fundamental because it "provides for the best interests of children to be
raised by their natural parents (instrumental basis), or because it follows
from a coherent political philosophy about the limited power that a gov-
ernment should possess (individual dignity or autonomy basis)?"' 20 The
Court is peculiarly ill-equipped to define continually evolving social
concepts like the "family," in part because these are highly individualis-
tic, yet ironically normative, judgments requiring a delicate balance of
individual predilections with empirical evidence which often belies gut-
level reactions. 21 In addition, since the Court has not welcomed scien-
tific evidence in deciding issues of the family, it continues "to approve
legal rules based upon intuitive assumptions about human behavior that
research by psychologists has shown to be erroneous."'' 22 The Court still
operates on the false premise of the traditional nuclear family model;
however, only 15% of U.S. households are comprised of a working hus-
band, homemaker wife, and children.' 23 Although the Court has so far
privacy is justified "as a contractarian check against legislative failure only if the intensely
interested individuals who suffer under privacy-infringing statutes are for some reason unable to
express their preferences intensities effectively in the political process." Lynn A. Stout, Strict
Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect
Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1802, 1805 (1992). "Children's rights, of course, usually
mean rights that adults think children should have. Historically, children's rights have been
severely limited in practice because they depend upon adults for articulation, assertion, and
enforcements." Barbara Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1051 (1992).
120. Herring, supra note 40, at 168. "Two apparently contradictory historical developments
have occurred simultaneously in family law. One involves a gradually growing emphasis on
privacy and individual rights; the other, a gradual increase in the involvement of the legal system
in the internal functioning of families." Steven Mintz, Children, Families and the State:
American Family Law in Historical Perspective, 69 DENv. L. REv. 635, 636 (1992).
121. For a discussion of the normative basis of family law issues, see William Wesley Patton,
Evolution in Child Abuse Litigation: The Theoretical Void Where Evidentiary and Procedural
Worlds Collide, 25 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1009, 1013-15 (1992); see also Richard Delgado, Norms
and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. Rev.
933, 943-44 (1991); John E.B. Myers, The Child Sexual Abuse Literature: A Call for Greater
Objectivity, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1709 (1990). For a discussion of the basic constitutional right to
procreate, see Stacey Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, Or
Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1, 79-80 (1992).
122. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and
Psychology, 66 IND. L. REv. 137, 138-39 (1990).
123. Laurie Beckland, The Word 'Family' Gains New Meaning, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1990, at
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resisted defining family protection as a fundamental right, state courts
and legislatures have actively responded to people's needs to be for-
mally and socially recognized as a family unit.'
2 4
Although the constitutional bases for holding parents' rights to
child rearing fundamental are uncertain and as yet ill-defined by the
Court, the "primary role of parents in the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."'
25
The variables of biological relationship, legal custody, and significant
A-3, A-34. "Today, half of all marriages end in divorce, with a corresponding high rate of
remarriage. A common by-product of this marital sequence is the 'blended' family-a family
consisting of at least one stepparent and one or more children of a previous marriage." Note,
Stepparent Visitation Rights: Toward the Best Interests of the Child, 30 J. FAM. L. 943, 943
(1991-92).
The United States Census defines family as "two or more persons related by birth, marriage
or adoption who reside in the same household." Jerrold Footlick, What Happened To The
Family?, in Special Edition: The 21st Century Family, NEWSWEEK, Winter/Spring 1990, at 18.
The American Home Economics Association (AHEA) has adopted a definition of family as "two
or more individuals who share goals, resources and a commitment over a period of time." Kris
Franklin, A Family Like Any Other Family: Alternative Methods of Defining Family in Law, 18
N.Y.U. L. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1027, 1029 (1990-91). "The postmodern family is a pastiche
of different kinship structures. Two-parent working families, single parent families, blended
families, adoptive families, like-sex parent families, test-tube babies and surrogate mothers...
[w]hat characterizes these kinship structures is that they often necessitate mutual independence
and autonomy." David Elkind, The Law And Postmodern Perceptions Of Children And Youth, 69
DENY. U. L. REv. 575, 575 (1992).
124. For instance in California, for a "$10 filing fee, any family-traditional or not-can
receive an ornate color certificate bearing a gold seal that declares the household an association
called the 'Family of [Doe].'" Beckland, supra note 123, at A-3. Courts using a functional
approach "look beyond traditional definitions of family and include relationships that share the
fundamental characteristics of the nuclear family . . . such as long-term commitment and
economic interdependence." Note, Family Law--Visitation Rights-New York Court of Appeals
Refuses to Adopt a Functional Analysis in Defining Family Relationships-Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 105 HARV. L. REV. 941, 941 (1992). Courts and legislatures have begun to recognize
"equitable parenthood" for non-biological caretakers who provide children the equivalent support
of traditional parents. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987); In re Patricia L., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 631, 633 -34 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Robin N., 9 Cal. Rptr.
512, 516 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Rachael C., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 473, 476-78 (Ct. App. 1991); CAL. R.
CT., Rule 1412(e); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2) (1990); Susan Goldstein & Christopher Soltys,
Mothers and Significant Others: Parental Standing to Seek Visitation Rights in the Best Interests
of the Child, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 417, 424-28 (1991); Beverly Horsburgh,
Redefining the Family: Recognizing the Altruistic Caretaker and the Importance of Relational
Needs, 25 U. MICH. J. REF. 433, 457-59, 482 (1992) (arguing that we should redefine family to
include all full-time caretakers); John Kydd, Abandoning Our Children: Mothers. Alcohol and
Drugs, 69 DENY. L. REv. 359, 362 (1992) (arguing that parents should be able to choose, with
court approval, persons to assist natural parents in rearing children who would provide care and a
voice for children if family problems arise); Janet Richards, The Natural Parent Preference
Versus Third Parties: Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16 NOVA L. REV. 733, 735 (1992).
125. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). Children's rights advocates, however,
have long maintained that a parent-centered system ultimately harms children because many
abuses can be shielded behind the private doors of the proverbial nuclear family. For an excellent
argument for a child-centered definition of family, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the
Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993).
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relationship and support have been identified as relevant in determining
whether an adult has a relationship with a child sufficient to constitute a
fundamental liberty interest protected by substantive and procedural due
process.
1. BIOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP
In Lehr v. Robertson, the Court determined that mere biological
parentage is insufficient to give rise to a fundamental parent/child rela-
tionship requiring notice and a hearing before the adoption of a child.I26
And in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court upheld a California statute
that created a presumption that a child born to a married woman living
with her husband is a child of that marriage and that the putative father
possessed neither substantive nor procedural due process protection. 2"
Michael H. was interesting because it also determined that the child did
not have a due process right to maintain a filial relationship with both
the putative natural father and the presumed marital father because such
a triadic relationship "has no support in the history or traditions of this
country."' 28 Some children's advocates have applauded the Court's
devaluation of biology since "[d]octrines that focus on genetic parentage
to the exclusion of those who care for the child ... overvalue procrea-
tion and undervalue nurture, at a time when nurture is in very short
supply."',
29
A biological connection, although not dispositive, is, a critical con-
stitutional precept in defining a person's liberty interest in a child. In
Stanley v. Illinois, the Court held that a statute automatically making a
child of a dead mother and an unwed father a ward of the state without a
hearing violated the Equal Protection Clause. 30 The Court has also
relied on the absence of a biological connection to deny fundamental
constitutional status to the relationship between foster children and fos-
ter parents.' 3 '
126. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). See also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Michael Dale,
The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Nonmarital Children: Mixed Blessings, 5 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 523, 533-34 (1989).
127. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
128. Id. at 2346.
129. Woodhouse, supra note 119, at 113-14. See also Christian Van Deusen, The Best Interest
of the Child and the Law, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 417, 436-41 (1991). That psychological-parenting
approach "recently has been challenged by supporters of 'attachment theory' ... [which stresses]
the importance of the child's continuing contact with the biological parents.. .[because] a child is
capable of forming attachments of different kinds with a number of individuals." Susan Brooks,
Rethinking Adoption: A Federal Solution to the Problem of Permanency Planning for Children
with Special Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1130, 1139 (1991).
130. 405 U.S. 645, 647-51 (1972).
131. Smith v. Organization of Foster Parents, 431 U.S. 816, 823 (1977). In Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), the California Supreme Court ruled that the woman who provided the
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2. LEGAL CUSTODY
Legal custody alone, especially by a non-biological parent, has
been held insufficient to support fundamental substantive or procedural
due process rights to associate with a child. Although the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled, "it is generally held that the relationship
[between a stepparent and stepchild] would terminate upon divorce or
the death of the natural parent. Both statutes and common law uphold
this proposition."' 32 In addition, as was earlier stated, foster parents
who have temporary custody of children do not possess fundamental due
process rights.'
33
The Court has not yet ruled whether prospective adoptive parents
who have custody of a child who has been legally freed for adoption
after parental termination have a fundamental liberty interest in the rela-
tionship. Traditionally, however, "adoptive parents receive limited pro-
tection throughout the adoption process up until the final adoption order
is granted."' 34 Prospective adoptive parents' liberty interests are argua-
bly less than those of biological custodial parents because permanent
legal custody is still contingent upon the adoption's finalization.
Because prospective adoptive parents do have a reasonable expectation
of a permanent parent/child relationship unless a change of circumstance
egg which, combined with her husbands sperm, created an embryo which was gestated by the
surrogate mother, was the legal and biological mother. The court determined that when two
women each seek declaration as a child's mother, genetic relation trumps gestation. The court
noted that the decision best promotes certainty and stability for the child. The court also focused
upon which woman had the original idea to procreate this child and determined that in this case it
was the genetic mother. The court's opinion is also strongly based upon the gestational mother's
contractual waiver of parenthood.
132. Note, Third Party Custody and Visitation: How Many Ways Should We Slice The Pie?, I
DET. C.L. Rav. 163, 172 (1963). Nevertheless, in Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978),
the court held that a stepparent had a right to a hearing before association with the child could
cease due to a divorce. But that case was decided not on the custody of the child, but rather on a
best interests of the child/psychological bonding theory. See Third Party Custody and Visitation,
supra, at 173 and nn.73-74.
133. Smith, 431 U.S. at 823. Foster parents, however, are frequently accorded statutory
preferences for adoptive placement if the natural parents' parental rights have been severed. See,
e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.25(g). In addition, if the agency placed the child with foster
parents "for adoptive placement," the foster parents are often entitled to the rights accorded
prospective adoptive parents. Jinny N. v. Super. Ct., 241 Cal. Rptr. 95, 96-97 (Ct. App. 1987).
Also, if the child had lived with foster parents for a considerable period of its life, the child's best
interests in the continuity of that relationship may outweigh a recently appearing natural parent's
right to custody. In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 351-54 (D.C. 1992). The nation has been inundated
with reports and fictional accounts of Deboer v. Schmidt, Nos. 96366, 96441, 96531, 96532
(Mich., July 2, 1993). Because the natural parents' rights had not been terminated and since the
adoption was not final, the child was ordered back to her natural parents. See Douglas Donnelly,
When Interests Of The Child Prevail Over Parental Rights, L.A.D.J., Aug. 11, 1993, at 6; Case
Updates, THE GUARDIAN, Summer 1993, at 13.
134. Comment, Best Interests Of Children And The Interests Of Adoptive Parents: Isn't It
Time for Comprehensive Reform?, 21 GoNz. L. REv. 749, 750 (1985).
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occurs, they arguably have a greater liberty interest in the child than do
foster parents.
It is likely that the Supreme Court under the Smith rationale will
determine that because the custodial prospective adoptive parent/child
relationship is not legally final, prospective adoptive parents have fewer
rights than biological custodial parents.1 35 The Supreme Court may
determine that the liberty interest of such parents is sufficient to require
a "rational relationship" test like it applied to the child's liberty argu-
ment in Michael H. 136 that she had a right to filial relationships with her
presumptive father and her putative natural father. Just as custody does
not automatically grant fundamental liberty, absence of custody is not a
bar to due process rights. For instance, in Caban v. Mohammad137 the
Court held that a non-custodial natural father who had earlier lived with
the children's mother for several years and who was identified on the
birth certificates as their father, was entitled to a hearing before the
mother and her husband could adopt the children. The Court held that
the state statute which distinguished between unmarried mothers and
fathers violated equal protection.
1 38
3. SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP AND SUPPORT
Because biological parenthood alone is insufficient to establish a
fundamental liberty interest in a child,139 courts have been forced to
determine what additional factors are relevant and sufficient to support
such an interest. The most frequently identified conditions for a natural
parent are a "demonstration of commitment to the child through the
assumption of personal, financial, or custodial responsibility." 4 ° One
must wonder why the Court has been so insistent upon a biological par-
ent's "good works" toward the child in defining the degree of liberty
interest. Is it contractually based, a notion like quantum meruit? (If I as
a parent pay to support the development of my child, it is only fair that I
be given control over the rearing and be afforded substantial due process
before the State can take away the benefit of my bargain and the fair
return on my investment.) Of course, the contractual model tends to cast
135. The court in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Dzurovcak, 600 N.E.2d 143, 144-148 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992), held that the trial court erred by denying custodial prospective adoptive parents
standing and an opportunity to be heard in a custody hearing brought by a natural parent who
recently had obtained a court order of paternity.
136. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2346 (1989).
137. 441 U.S. 380, 382-91 (1979).
138. The Court in Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2345 n.7, indicated that a different result might
apply "with regard to adulterous fathering of a child whom the marital parents do not wish to raise
as their own."
139. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
140. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2942 (1990).
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children in the apparently anachronistic role of property or chattel, the
equivalent of a branded animal under the control of its owner. "Children
are not chattel .... 41
A second rationale for placing great emphasis on the parent's care
of the child is that the closer the relationship the more likely the child
will be harmed if the contact is severed. This "best interests" emphasis
shifts the focus of the liberty deprivation to the effect upon the child.
But a "best interests" standard is unworkable because the degree of harm
cannot be determined until after a hearing and the interested parties' due
process rights at such a hearing need to be determined before the hearing
in order to decide whether counsel must be appointed or whether con-
frontation and cross-examination are applicable.
A third basis is economic. Society's interests are harmed if a nur-
turing, supportive parent is erroneously denied continued association
with the child. In most cases, the taxpayers will be forced to assist the
child for an indeterminate period and the child will suffer from adverse
psychological and social effects from the separation.
If "good works" and support determine whether biological parents
possess a fundamental liberty interest in the child, then what, besides
genetics, differentiates other adults who provide children economic and
psychological support? 4 z Under a purely economic model it should not
matter whether the support is from a parent or any responsible third
party. The same conclusion results under the contractual model; the
fairness of a return on one's investment does not vary with the donor
unless we make a distinction between those legally obligated to provide
support and those good-samaritans who volunteer financial aid, comfort,
and emotional support.'43
141. Mark V. v. Gale P., 540 N.Y.S.2d 966, 967 (Fam. Ct. 1989).
142. The waters become very muddy when courts must select between competing non-parental
relatives and current custodial caretakers. For instance, in In re C.B., No. 1-92-1988 (II1. App. Ct.
June 11, 1993) the court held that the evidence of psychological bonding with a natural mother's
friend was insufficient to support an award of permanent custody and guardianship to the friend
rather than the maternal grandmother who also wanted to adopt the child's two siblings.
143. Some courts have argued that parental legal obligations support greater liberty interests
than others who voluntarily provide such assistance. Courts "frequently consider dependency a
criterion for determining who may recover in a wrongful death action. Dependence usually
connotes pecuniary benefit but need not be confined to actual monetary support .... " Robyn
Meadows, Recovery by Stepchildren in Wrongful Death Actions, 40 KAN. L. REv. 777, 787
(1992). For a discussion of third-party child support obligations, see Richard Victor et al.,
Statutory Review of Third-Party Rights Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Support, 25 FAM. L.Q.
19, 24-25 (1991). It has also been argued that third parties who have been given consensual
access to children by custodians and who provide those children emotional support have a right
under equitable estoppel to continued association. For instance, if parents consent to a non-parent
"significant other" visiting with and nurturing the child "the parent should be estopped from
disavowing a relationship ... [they] ... both encouraged and relied upon when it was convenient
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Professor Dolgin has recently stated that the determinative differ-
ence in the results of Stanley and Caban, which recognized an unwed
father/child relationship, and Quilloin was that the first two resembled
families, while the last did not.1" She argued that because the father in
Michael H. established a commitment with the child, the Lehr emphasis
had been down played by the Court.145 She sees the plurality opinion in
Michael H. as holding that the unwed father cases are now predicated
upon a determination of whether the relationships among the father,
mother, and child developed within the sanctity of a "unitary family."' 4 6
"A biological father does protect his paternity by developing a social
relationship with his child, but this step demands the creation of a fam-
ily, a step itself depending upon an appropriate relationship between the
man and his child's mother. 1 47 The rationale behind distinguishing the
fundamental rights of unwed mothers from unwed fathers is historically
connected to the easily proven natural connection of mother and gesta-
tional child and the difficulty of establishing circumstantially the biolog-
ical father/child connection. Evidence of relationships between father
and child are socially based rather than biologically based.14 Although
to do so." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 428 (1973). The role
of extended family members in caring for abused or neglected children has dramatically increased.
On December 31, 1986 there were 45 children in New York City living in a newly
created form of foster care known there as 'approved relative homes.' By
December 31, 1991, there were 23,591, or well over half of the total children in
family foster care. In five short years, the exception had become the norm.
Marianne Takas, Kinship Care: Developing a Safe and Effective Framework for Protective
Placement of Children with Relatives, 13 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 12 (1992).
144. Janet L. Dolgin, Just A Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L.
REv. 637, 662 (1993).
145. Id. at 665.
146. Id. at 666 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989)).
147. Id. at 671. But see In re Matter Of Raquel Marie X., 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 517 (1990), where the court struck down as unconstitutional a statute which
premised the father's right to consent to adoption upon his living with the mother, because that
requirement was not sufficiently related to the state's interest in assuring a quality relationship
between the child and father.
148. Id. at 642, 669. Professor Dolgin's exegesis and synthesis of the unwed father cases are
intriguing, but incomplete. There are a number of other reasons why the Court has treated
mothers' rights differently from fathers'. First, allowing long forgotten fathers to reenter the
family custody arrangement may create an "impediment to the smooth operation of child
placement agencies" if the unwed father can "block adoption proceedings" and compete for the
child's custody. Linda Crane, Family Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REV. 427, 449
(1993). In addition, the justices have an individual moral vision of what the legal family should
look like and reject groups which deviate from that ideal. "The Supreme Court's rulings in the
unwed father cases are inconsistent and generally reflect a subjective assessment of the worthiness
of an unpopular party, the unwed father." Id. at 453, 466-68.
Of course, the Court's stereotype of mothers will be constantly under empirical pressure to
change as the role women play in families continues to evolve.
The distinction between family life and civil society, coupled with women's
entrance into civil society in large numbers, has thus created a disfiinction between
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Professor Dolgin's theories partially explain why the Court has limited
unwed father's rights, the theory has little application to the questions
regarding siblings' association rights.1 49
B. A Constitutional Basis for Siblings' Rights
Professor Tribe has argued that" 'family rights,' " as recently ana-
lyzed by the Supreme Court, really emerge as "rights of individuals
only" and that "the stereotypical 'family unit' that is so much a part of
our constitutional rhetoric is becoming decreasingly central to our con-
stitutional reality."' ° If he is correct, then it becomes increasingly criti-
cal that the Court determine children's association rights as distinct from
parents' rights to associate with their children. Only then can children's
interests be comparably balanced by the Court in determining with
whom and under what circumstances they will have a right to live, visit,
and know. Perhaps the easiest starting point in discussing children's
association rights is an application of the current court standards for
determining parental rights. Is the parent/child association analogy
appropriate?
We will begin our analysis with the brightest line; do identical
twins possess a constitutional right to associate with one another? Iden-
theory and reality. The divergent realms of male-dominated civil society and
female-shaped family life have become entangled and confused in response to
modem society's diverse pressures upon both men and women.
Julie Novkov, A Deconstruction of (M)otherhood and a Reconstruction Of Parenthood, 19 REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 155, 166 (1991-1992). Traditional conceptions of biology and motherhood
limit women's ability to function competitively in an economic marketplace because they "often
lead employers to have different expectations regarding the behavior and conduct of their female
employees than those they hold for their male employees." Id. at 168.
149. Homer Clark has noted that Michael H. "leaves open the question whether Michael's
claim of paternity would be entitled to constitutional recognition if, after Victoria's birth, Carole
and Gerald had been divorced, or separated, or were no longer caring for Victoria as a going
family." Homer Clark, Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 16 (1992). Once
the biological mother decides to abandon a child, the unwed father's interest coupled with the
child's might provide sufficient grounds for giving custody to the unwed father. In Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2946 (1990), the Court stated in regards to a two-parent custodial
family that "[i]t follows that the combined force of the separate interests of one parent and the
minor's privacy interest must outweigh the separate interests of one parent." Once parental rights
are severed, the basis of denying association rights in the unwed father cases is irrelevant to the
issue of whether bonded siblings should be permitted to continue associating. The Court's moral
opprobrium toward unwed fathers has no application to innocent siblings caught in a legal custody
web.
150. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1461 (2d ed. 1988). See also
Barbara Woodhouse, "Who Owns The Child? "': Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33
WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1039 (1992) ("[T]he redefinition of the family as a grouping of
individuals with individual rights and interests created tensions among family members which, in
turn, led to a growing involvement of legislatures and judges in setting standards of family
behavior and in mediating disputes among family members.").
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tical twins are "genetically indistinguishable," and thus have an even
greater biological connection than a natural parent and child or even
fraternal twins who "share, on average, 50 percent of their genes and
may be the same or opposite sex." '' Because identical twins possess an
even closer genetic connection than an unwed father or mother with
their child, they should be recognized as equivalently possessing a
potential fundamental family association right under Lehr. 52 In addi-
tion, empirical studies have consistently demonstrated the intimate psy-
chological bond between identical twins. Often separation from or death
of an identical twin causes long-term grief significantly greater than the
loss of a parent.'
53
Is a relationship between identical twins or any sibling group living
together a relationship that has "support in the history and traditions of
this country?"1 54 Under contemporary law the answer is "yes" as sib-
lings are recognized as legally related in every jurisdiction.155 Siblings'
family relationships are vested and perfected unlike the parent/child
relationships between prospective adoptive parents or foster parents.
Further, unlike foster parents, siblings have a realistic expectation that
they will be able to sustain a continuing life-long relationship.
The history of children and siblings in early America is much less
certain. Family law, including children's family association rights, in
the colonies "varied sharply from one colony to another."1 56 In Puritan
regions such as Massachusetts and Connecticut, there was great "empha-
sis on family unity" which was subject to patriarchal control and com-
munity supervision. Children were considered "as subordinate and
dependent beings"; children were often separated from indigent parents
and were required "to work for strangers." 157 In Maryland, South Caro-
lina, and Virginia, where "widows were more likely to be left with
15 1. Lori Andrews, Some Kind of Weird Twin Thing: Research on the Special Relationship of
Twins Provides a Lucrative Legal Tool, CAL. LAW., April, 1992, at 26.
152. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1989).
153. Andrews, supra note 143.
154. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2346 (1989).
155. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-3(a)(2) (intercourse between siblings is incest); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332(A)(2) & (3) (court may consider sibling relationships in determining
custody); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-215(l) (sibling visitation); CAL. CIv. CODE § 230.8 (siblings
can register to locate one another after age of majority); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-113.5
(sibling registry); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-44(a)(b) (sibling adoption subsidy); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 409.166(1), (2)(a), (c), (e) (financial subsidy for sibling group adoption); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.575 (sibling registry); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-572 (sibling visitation); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 541 (adoption subsidy for siblings); MD. FAM. LAW CODE § 5-4A-02 (sibling
registry); N.J. REv. STAT. § 9:2-7-1 (sibling visitation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.39(D)
(siblings related); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-139 (sibling registry).
156. Mintz, supra note 120, at 637.
157. Id. at 638, 640-41.
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young children," women were given much more independent control
and protection.
158
The social and legal conception of children transmogrified during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries due to "rapid population growth,
increasing religious fragmentation, new ideologies emphasizing personal
privacy and the spread of market relationships that undercut paternalistic
social relationships."' 59 By the mid-1800s, courts began to define
parental control of children "not as absolute power conferred by God,
but a civic duty conferred and regulated by the state."' 6 ° By the nine-
teenth century, society began to formulate protectionist laws based upon
"a new sentimental conception of children as vulnerable," and child
labor laws were pressed by societies for the prevention of cruelty to
children.' 6' By the 1920s, family law was increasingly influenced by
psychological and clinical studies of the family stressing "the impor-
tance of continuity and stability in caretakers."' 162 Finally, since the
1960s, courts have begun to stress the individual rights of family mem-
bers, including children. In certain areas, courts "have held that minors
have independent rights that can override parental authority. ' 63
Therefore, just as it is impossible to accurately define the role of
father's and mother's association rights throughout the history of our
country, so too have children's association rights continually evolved.
Nevertheless, the most important point in applying the Michael H. stan-
dard to sibling relationships is that brothers and sisters living in the same
family have AL WAYS been treated as natural members of a family unit,
unlike the unwed father who was denied a fundamental liberty interest in
Michael H. Therefore, the historical and contemporary evidence sup-
ports a clear finding that sibling's association has been a relationship
historically endemic to the American definition of family. Siblings, just
like parents and children, should clearly be held to possess an inherent,
fundamental liberty interest in continued contact and association.
Although identical twins may not provide the same "personal,
financial, or custodial responsibility" which an adult parent may pro-
vide, the twins' demonstration of an emotional and relational commit-
ment is an alternative equivalent.' 6  In fact several empirical studies
have demonstrated that identical twins share not only the usual
158. Id. at 638.
159. Id. at 641-42. Woodhouse, supra note 119, at 1037.
160. Woodhouse, supra note 119, at 1038.
161. Mintz, supra note 120, at 643-49; Woodhouse, supra note 119, at 1040-41, 1054-56,
1059-62.
162. Mintz, supra note 120, at 651.
163. Id. at 653-54.
164. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2942 (1990).
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equivalent of parental support, but a much deeper and intense sharing of
identity.' 65 The separation of twins is perhaps a much greater liberty
deprivation than a severance of parent and child.1 66 It is therefore diffi-
cult to argue that identical twins, unlike an unwed father who provides a
modicum of support, do not have a constitutionally based liberty interest
in associating with one another.
The same analysis applies to other siblings. The only difference
between identical twins and other biological siblings is the degree of
genetic similarity. 167  In terms of psychological support and bonding,
empirical studies clearly demonstrate the critical importance of siblings
to one another. "[T]odlers with close, affectionate relations with their
siblings show an earlier development of the ability to role-play, to act as
conciliator and to cooperate with others."'168 Older siblings also provide
165. The intangible right of a child to preserve his or her identity is recognized in Article 8 of
the United Nations Convention On The Rights Of The Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989), reprinted in 28 INr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1456 (1990). For a
discussion, see George Stewart, Interpreting the Child's Right to Identity in the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child, 26 FAM. L.Q. 221 (1992).
166. The separation of identical twins is not just a normal custody decision, it is a loss of
personal identity more equivalent to cases of involuntary sterilization.
167. Whether non-biological siblings have identical due process rights is an open question and
will depend upon the associational theory applied. If the Michael H. test of an historically
recognized family relationship and the Lehr biological connection tests are applied, then non-
biological siblings have a weak case. One could argue, however, that neither of those cases is
applicable since the siblings are part of a legally recognized family unit unlike the unmarried
father and his child. But, if we apply a psychological bonding/best interests of the children test,
then biology should not be required. Equal protection will also rear its Hydra head since it is
possible that biological, adoptive, and step-siblings will be treated differently in regards to their
right to continue associating even though the state interest in the best interest of the child would
not compel such a result.
A state's interests may begin to fiercely compete. If adopted children are given a new birth
certificate and become part of the adopted family in order to assure as natural a family unit and as
full a public acceptance as possible, what overriding public interest favors splitting the natural and
adopted brother and/or sister after the parent's rights have been terminated? Should association
rights be different depending upon the procedural mechanism used? In other words, should step-
siblings be permitted to visit pursuant to a divorce custody order, but not according to a
declaration of adoption into different families?
Such a distinction neglects not only the close emotional ties between even step-siblings, but
also fails to consider the scope of the problem. "With a national divorce rate of 50% and a
slightly higher re-divorce rate, researchers estimate that up to two-thirds of children who
experience their own parents' divorce will go through a subsequent one involving a parent and
stepparent." Paula Lynn Parks, Stepping Carefully, L.A. TIMES, March 8, 1995, at E3.
"'The step-siblings I've talked to-and I've talked to lots-usually get along pretty
well with each other and usually they would want to maintain some kind of
relationship unless there is a huge age gap.' said Manly Coleman, stepfamily
researcher and co-author with husband Lawrence Ganong of 'Remarried Family
Relationships.'"
Id. at E8.
168. Robert Hannafor, Timing, Fragility and Children's Law, 69 DENy. U. L. Rv. 593, 602
(1992). "Severance of existing emotional ties between the child and . . .siblings . . . may be
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younger brothers and sisters substantial emotional support, and studies
demonstrate that siblings as "young as 14 months old provide older sib-
lings comfort."1 69  In addition, siblings provide a family subsystem
which lasts a lifetime, often for 60 to 80 years, and grieving over a lost
sibling may be lifelong. 70 "A sibling relationship can be an independ-
ent emotionally supportive factor for children in ways quite distinctive
from other relationships, and there are benefits and experiences that a
child reaps from a relationship with his or her brother(s) or sister(s)
which truly cannot be derived from any other."'' 7' It is quite telling that
more siblings separated from their natural families search for their bio-
logical siblings than search for their biological parents. One of the most
frequent reasons children run away from foster homes is to visit
siblings. 
1 72
Several facets of contemporary family and social conditions have
made sibling attachments even more critical than ever: 1) the shrinking
size of extended families; 2) longer life spans; 3) increased divorce
rates; 4) expanded geographic mobility; 5) more full and part-time work-
ing mothers; and 6) increasing numbers of parents without adequate
parenting skills.
73
Those few courts that have determined that children possess a fun-
damental family associational right have had great difficulty articulating
the basis of that precept. 74 For example, the court in L. v. G. specifi-
harmful to the child and may impede her formation of new relationships." Note, Visitation After
Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 633, 633 (1984). See supra part
I1, for an extended discussion of the positive aspects of sibling bonds.
169. Dunn & Kendrick, supra note 70, at 93-94, 114.
170. Ward, Sibling Ties in Foster Care and Adoption Planning, 63 CHILD WELFARE 321, 322
(1984); BANK & KAHN, supra note 64, at 6, 9-10, 13.
171. L. v. G., 497 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
172. LE PERE ET AL., supra note 50, at 2. For extensive studies of adoptees' searches for
natural family members, see JOHN TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCE OF
ADOPTED PEOPLE (1973), and ARTHUR SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE (1978); see
also Alan Watahara, California's Foster Care-Dependency System: Forgotten Children in a
Bureaucracy of Care 426 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1987). A recent
English study found "evidence of fairly widespread satisfaction-sometimes entirely
unexpected-in discovering long-lost siblings." Heather Humphrey & Michael Humphrey,
Damaged Identity And The Search For Kinship In Adult Adoptees, 62 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL.
301, 306 (1989).
173. BANK & KAHN, supra note 64, at 12.
174. The United States Supreme Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2346
(1989), stated, "[w]e have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest,
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship."
Nevertheless, children's independent rights have been recognized recently by a few courts.
For example, in In re Arturo A., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131, 138 (Ct. App. 1992), the court recognized
that the child's entitlement to maintain a family unit and to have a finalized permanent life plan is
supported by the Supreme Court's recent recognition of "rights of personality" in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Other courts, however, have held that the right of
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cally held that siblings' "unbreakable links of heredity" and the "emo-
tionally supportive" relationship lead to a conclusion that "siblings
possess the natural, inherent and inalienable right to visit with each
other."' 75 Although the court did not expressly amplify the basis for its
holding, the logic of L. v. G. is similar to the Lehr Court's requirement
of biological connection plus commitment toward the child, here a
brother or sister. Further, since the siblings in that case lived together in
a traditionally recognized legal family relationship, the L. v. G. holding
is also consistent with the Michael H. standard since relationships
between brothers and sisters have strong "support in the history or tradi-
tions of this country."' 7 6
A few courts, afraid of burdening state and federal courts with new
causes of action by siblings for wrongful death, loss of consortium, or
statutory failure to facilitate family reunification, have suggested
strained reasons why sibling relationships should not receive the same
liberty protection as parent/child relationships.1 77  For instance, in
an adoptee to know his or her origins and identity is not a fundamentally protected liberty interest.
See In re Roger B., 418 N.E. 2d 751 (II1. 1981); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics,
372 A.2d 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977); Pamela Smith, Regulating Confidentiality of
Surrogacy Records: Lessons from the Adoption Experience, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 65, 85-
88 (1992-93). And in Gregory K. v. Ralph K., No. CI92-5127, 1992 WL 551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
July 20, 1992), the court held that the child had an independent right to ask the court to determine
whether his parents' rights should be severed and whether he should be reared by others. The
Florida Supreme Court in In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989), determined that minors possess
constitutional rights, and the court in Gregory K. held that Gregory K., like any other natural
person, had access to the court to redress his claim. See Miriam Rollin, Gregory K.-The Legal
Basis, 14 GuARDIAN 12 (Fall 1992); Howard Davidson, From the Editor, Making Too Much of
'Gregory K'--And Too Little, 13 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. (Fall 1992); Mother Can't Meet with
Son in Parental Termination Suit, L.A.D.J., Sept. 23, 1992, at 3; Boy Granted 'Divorce'from
Parents, L.A.D.J., Sept. 28, 1992, at 8; Boy Is Granted 'Divorce'from Natural Parents, L.A.
TimEs, Sept. 26, 1992, at pt. 1, p. 1; Child Has Standing to Bring Termination Petition, I I A.B.A.
Juv. & CHILD WELFARE L. Rv. 110. An issue in Gregory K. that has not received attention is
whether Gregory's siblings' association rights were violated when the trial court refused to grant
the siblings standing in the custody/parental termination hearing. See supra, Mother Can't Meet
with Son in Parental Termination Suit, at 3. The court should have granted the siblings standing
and determined whether association should continue even after the parental rights were
terminated. In In re Adoption of A.G.K., 728 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. 1986), the court held that because
the state's termination of the parental rights statute violated the child's "fundamental liberty
interest in its continuation [of the parent\child relationship,] ... [i]t offends the child's state and
federal constitutional due process rights-both procedural and substantive." But in DeBoer v.
Schmidt, Nos. 96366, 96441, 96531, 96532 (Mich. July 2, 1993), the court found that "while the
child does have a due process liberty interest in her family life, her rights are dependent on the
rights of her biological parents. Only if a parent is found unfit can a child assert her own
independent rights." Legal Analysis: The Latest Chapter in the DeBoer v. Schmidt Case, 12
A.B.A. Juv. & CHILD WELFARE L. REv. 92, 94 (1993).
175. L. v. G., 497 A.2d 215, 220-22 (1985).
176. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2346 (1989).
177. For detailed analyses of the hostility toward children's loss of consortium claims, see,
e.g., Michael Mogill, And Justice for Some: Assessing the Need to Recognize the Child's Action
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Ascani v. Hughes a decedent's estate and his siblings brought a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action under a wrongful death statute for "loss of freedom
of association. 1' 78 In denying relief, the court quoted Sanchez v. Mar-
quez, which almost a decade earlier had denied siblings monetary
wrongful death damages stating:
Where the right to raise, educate and associate with one's own child
may rise to constitutional dimensions, the right of siblings to have
their brother or sister continue living does not. The relationship
between a parent and its off-spring and the relationship between a
brother and sibling is not a difference in degree, it is a difference in
kind. Though one has a constitutional right to have or not have a
child, one does not have a constitutional right to have or not have a
brother.' 
79
The Ascani court also refused to recognize the sibling wrongful death
action because it feared that courts would have no way of limiting simi-
lar damage actions brought by any other individuals who have estab-
lished " 'emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
associations.' "180
The Ascani and Sanchez courts' reasoning for denying siblings
wrongful death damages is unconvincing, illogical, and inconsistent
with over 40 years of United States Supreme Court precedent. First, the
distinction between parents' free choice in having children and siblings'
inability to choose whether to have a brother or sister relationship is a
distinction without a substantive difference. The distinction may have
for Loss of Parental Consortium, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1321 (1992); Maureen Delaney, What About
the Children? Toward an Expansion of Loss of Consortium Recovery in the District of Columbia.
41 AM. U. L. REv. 107 (1991); John Palmeri & Christopher Kenney, Consortium Claims
Involving Children: Should Colorado Continue an Archaic Concept or Confront a Faulty
Cornerstone?, 69 DENV. U. L. REv. 481 (1992). See also Wise v. Timmons, 592 N.E.2d 840
(Ohio 1992). Applying the Ohio wrongful death statute that provides mental anguish damage to
siblings, Justice Holmes in his concurring opinion stated "[h]owever, I continue to have a
considerable problem with the issue of sibling recovery of damages for mental anguish under
Ohio's wrongful death statute." Id. (Holmes, J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court in
Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), recently ruled that children do not have an independent
federal cause of action against states which fail to use the suggested family reunification services
in the Federal Adoption and Assistance Act. The court in Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp.
1002, 1005 (N.D. III. 1989) had previously found "that the children's relationships with their
siblings are the sort of 'intimate human relationships' that are afforded 'a substantial measure of
sanctuary from unjustified interference from the state'
178. 470 So. 2d 207, 208 (1985).
179. Id. at 211 (quoting Sanchez v. Marquez, 457 F. Supp. 359, 363 (D. Colo. 1978)).
180. Ascani, 470 So. 2d at 212. Trujillo v. Board Of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1189
(10th Cir. 1985), rejected the notion that recognizing sibling association rights would open the
floodgates under § 1983. Although the Trujillo court recognized the liberty associational rights of
siblings, it held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a specific intent by the defendant to
interfere with that right.
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some relevance to monetary damages, 18' but it decants the complex mul-
tifarious Supreme Court family association cases into a single disposi-
tive element, the ability to voluntarily procreate. Not only does this
belie the trend of Supreme Court opinions from Lehr forward which
have delimited the significance of biological parentage, it also strips
family association rights of their rich texture of group-shared ideals and
emotional support as articulated by the Court in Smith, Roberts, and
Moore. 1
82
The Ascani/Sanchez focus on voluntary procreation would take
away from some adults whose religion forbids the use of contraception
or abortion a fundamental parent/child liberty interest. Even if one takes
a strained view of human nature and holds such individuals have chosen
to have a child if they do not practice sexual abstinence during their
lifetime, women with those religious views who are raped certainly do
not have a free choice in conceiving a child. But no court has ever held
that a child conceived through rape has a lesser liberty interest in a par-
ent/child family associational relationship than one conceived by pre-
meditated parental intent. In fact, such a policy denying fundamental
parenting rights to an unwed, raped mother who cares for the child is
clearly against all of the contemporary Supreme Court rulings that have
long decided claims to maternity "on biological motherhood."' 183 It is
also ironic that the Ascani and Sanchez cases strip association rights
from siblings because of their status as involuntary family members
since the Court in a series of earlier cases determined that "imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of
our system that burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility."' 84
Second, the Ascani and Sanchez courts' fears of unlimited claims to
fundamental associational rights are also misplaced. Granting siblings
fundamental liberty association will not entitle other third parties to sim-
181. The statutes which were promulgated to further family unity have been held inapplicable
to family economic issues. For instance, in County of Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797,
799-800 (Ct. App. 1993), the court held that a putative father was a legal father obliged to pay
statutory child support even though, pursuant to Evidence Code § 621, as an unmarried father he
had no standing to seek child custody. The father was denied the benefit of the non-paternity
presumption "as a financial prophylactic." Id. at 800.
182. Smith v. Organization of Foster Parents, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
183. Dolgin, supra note 136, at 672. Professor Dolgin raised interesting questions regarding
whether biological maternity will remain the central issue in surrogate mother cases where
"competing claims to maternity between different women and competing claims to parenthood
between men and women" must be determined. Id. at 673-89. For a recent case pitting the rights
of the genetic versus gestational mothers, see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
184. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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ilar access. The empirical data discussed in Section IV of this Article,
clearly demonstrate that the sibling bond is substantially greater and dif-
ferent than other third-party relationships, and that siblings often emo-
tionally need one another even more than they need parents, especially if
their parents physically or emotionally abuse them. Further, as was ear-
lier demonstrated, the relationship among siblings clearly meets the
Michael H. test for relationships which are part of the American family
fabric. Courts can easily distinguish siblings' association rights from
others' rights just as the Court has already distinguished the association
rights of biological parents, unwed fathers, prospective adoptive parents,
and foster parents.
A host of variables support the conclusion that siblings have a fun-
damental substantive liberty interest in associating with one another.185
Brothers and sisters have been extremely close members of nuclear fam-
ilies during the history of this country. At no time has the law or society
treated them as anything but linked members of a family unit, and no
state has ever determined that separating biological siblings is presump-
tively in the best interest of the children during maturation. Siblings
have been legally separated only when some event such as parental
death or incapacity, divorce, child abuse, or neglect has occurred. Psy-
chological research overwhelmingly supports the continuation of the sib-
ling bond. Longitudinal studies demonstrate that separated siblings'
have an enduring desire to reunite, and changing demographics and
increasing longevity mean that siblings need and may rely upon one
another's support for over 80 years.
"[A]n increasing number of psychologists believe that relationships
with siblings can be among the most important in life. And a growing
body of research suggests that sibling ties become more, not less, impor-
tant as we age." 186 The legislatures in all 50 states have recognized the
importance of sibling bonds by passing statutes permitting adult siblings
to voluntarily find one another through sibling registries. It is time for
the Court to declare, as it has with the only other historically recognized
185. Katie Watson has recently noted the importance of the right of association as a functional
"wall between the moral autonomy of the citizenry and the normalizing power of the State." Katie
Watson, An Alternative to Privacy: The First Amendment Right of Intimate Association, 19
N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 891, 925 (1992). It is particularly necessary for siblings to
continue their intimacy once the child dependency system thrusts a socially masticated normative
structure upon them; they will lose family and historical identity in the child welfare system.
Continued sibling association and dialogue will "serve as bulwarks against totalitarianism" in the
form of state-mandated, normative alternative family structures. See id. at 918. "It stands to
reason that when the institution of the family is homogenized, the range of ideas and identities
present in our society is also narrowed." Id. at 921.
186. Diane Swanbrow, Brother, Can You Spare Some Time?, L.A. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 7,
1990, Part 2, page 9.
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family relationship, parent and child, that siblings have a fundamental
liberty interest in associating, and that only after a procedurally fair due
process hearing may the State separate siblings and only then because it
is the least drastic alternative in the children's best interest.
C. Siblings' Procedural Due Process Rights
The Court's "preference for procedural solutions" to litigated chil-
dren's issues "offer[s] the appearance of resolving difficult problems
while actually sending substantive decisions to less visible levels of
administrative or lower court decisions."' 87 Rather than defining bright
line substantive rights for children, the Court issues procedural machin-
ery for deciding issues on a case by case basis. "Procedural solutions
are not inapt for the kinds of problems posed by many issues of chil-
dren's rights-where a general rule could well hurt some children even
while helping others."1 88 Therefore, assuming the Court recognizes a
substantive sibling associational right, we should not expect a pro-
nouncement that siblings must live together. Rather, tradition foretells
an opinion that would set a balancing test for determining under what
circumstances siblings must remain or be brought together and a defini-
tion of minimal procedures required in making that determination.
Since children's rights have historically evolved after adult's rights,'89
the Court has usually engaged in a comparative analysis in determining
the degree of procedural protection required. The Court has often
applied a "'dual-maximal approach' that combines 'fundamental fair-
ness' and 'functional equivalence' " which often provides juveniles
more and/or different procedural protection than adults.1 90 The Court
has held that in juvenile delinquency hearings, which had for years been
termed non-adversarial civil dispositions, juveniles are entitled to most
187. Martha Minow, Constitutional Bicentennial Symposium: The "Rights Revolution", Are
Rights Right for Children?, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 203, 211 (1987).
188. Id. at 211.
189. Of course, not everyone agrees that children should be treated equally with adults or that
granting children more extensive rights is in society's best interest. "There is good reason to think
that, despite its appealing conceptual simplicity, a policy of granting children equal rights
wouldn't be the best way to resolve the problems we face. Some version of protectionism is far
more promising." LAURA M. PURDY, IN THEIR BEST INTEREST? THE CASE AGAINST EQUAL
RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 231 (1992).
190. Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward A New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV.
146, 173-73 (1989) (quoting from Irene M. Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children
Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656,
659 (1980)). Whether different procedures for children is in their best interest is debatable since
the "establishment of a separate body of law and specialized agencies to deal with [child] abuse
and neglect both justifies and ensures differential treatment of children." Anne McGillivray,
Reconstructing Child Abuse: Western Definition and Non-Western Experience, in MICHAEL
FREEMAN & PHILIP VEERMAN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 216 (1992).
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procedures available to adult criminal defendants: 1) A statement of the
allegations;19" ' 2) an opportunity for a hearing;' 92 3) access to relevant
data;'93 4) right to counsel; 94 5) right to confront witnesses;1 95 6) a priv-
ilege against self-incrimination; 196 7) a right to cross-examine witnesses;
and 8) a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. 197 The Court,
however, has determined on several occasions that minor's due process
rights are not -identical to adults: 1) minors have no right to jury trial in
delinquency hearings;' 98 2) double jeopardy is more flexible in juvenile
cases; 199 3) different standards apply to juvenile preventive detention;2°°
and 4) capital punishment of very young children violates the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.20 1 Nonetheless, the
Court has not had many opportunities to test children's due process
rights in determining family issues involving custody and association.2 °2
The remainder of this section will discuss whether the current procedural
due process protection accorded parents in severance hearings is
required for siblings whose association rights are being litigated.
1. STANDING AND NOTICE
A state must use reasonable means to notify natural parents, even
non-custodial parents, before parental custody is involuntarily changed
or parental rights are severed because the fundamental right to parent is
implicated.20 3 Standing usually requires a demonstration that a claimant
191. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 561.
194. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
195. Id. at 56.
196. Id. at 55. For a history of the development ofjuvenile delinquents' procedural protection,
see Michael Dale, Children Before the Supreme Court: In Whose Best Interests?, 53 ALB. L. REV.
513 (1989).
197. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
198. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
199. Swisher v. Brady, 483 U.S. 204, 210-11 (1978).
200. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1984).
201. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2689-91 (1988).
202. Of course, in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979), the Court stated that in
determining the level of procedural due process accorded minors who have been voluntarily
committed by parents to mental health institutions, the three-pronged Mathews v. Eldridge test
should be used. See Note, What Ever Happened To Parham and Institutionalized Juveniles. Do
Minors Have Procedural Rights in the Civil Commitment Area?, 14 L. & PSYCHOL. Rav. 281,
293-97 (1990).
203. In In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921 (D.C. 1992), the court held that a father could contest a
final adoption decree after the statute of limitations ran because his due process rights were
violated by placing his child without notice to him. In In re Adoption Of Kelsey S., 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d 615 (1992), the California Supreme Court determined that an unwed father's rights are
protected where the mother intentionally frustrated the father's attempts to develop a relationship
with his child. See also In re Female Infant F., 594 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1993) (unless an unwed father
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has or will suffer actual injury as a result of the conduct being contested,
that there is causation between the challenged action and the injury, and
that the injury could be redressed by access to the court.20 4 The Court
has recognized that children's interests may be greatly impacted by state
dependency and parental severance hearings. "For a child, the conse-
quences of termination of his natural parents' rights may well be far-
reaching."2 °5 Even the dissent in Santosky agreed that "[t]he child has
an interest in the outcome of the factfinding hearing independent of that
of the parent."206
Siblings' lives are significantly and permanently changed by child
dependency and parental severance hearings. Even if siblings are ini-
tially separated in different foster placements for what is intended to be a
short time, that separation dramatically increases the probability that
they will not be placed together if their parents' rights are later sev-
ered.207 In addition, if one or more siblings are adopted into separate
homes, the siblings will lose all association rights since adoption ends
all prior natural blood relationships. "Children are placed in a special
emotional and legal limbo after the termination of parental rights and
prior to adoption; legal ties and contacts with biological parents are cut
off and no substitute permanent ties yet exist. '20 8
meets statutory requirements, no notice of an adoption hearing is required); In re Robert O., 604
N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992). In Pattrell v. Ayers, No. 0049825, 1991 WL 258144 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 26, 1991), the court stated that only persons who are the biological, adoptive, or foster
parents of a child have standing to seek custody. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Dzurovcak, 600
N.E.2d 143, 144-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), the court held that prospective adoptive custodial
parents had standing at the custody hearing even though they did not have a finalized legal
relationship with the child. Finally, the Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989),
stated that it is uncertain whether a putative natural father has historically had standing to contest
the marital child's legitimacy. In that context, however, the Court noted even with standing the
putative father could still not state a cause of action. Id. at 2343.
204. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
205. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 n.l 1 (1982).
206. Id. at 788 n. 13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Department of Public Aid ex. rel., Cox v.
Miller, 586 N.E.2d 1251 (II!. 1992), the court held that a mother's contractual agreement to
dismiss her paternity action did not bar a later action by the child who was held to have an interest
independent and different from his parent.
207. See supra parts II and II1.
208. MARK HARDIN & ANN SHALLECK, COURT RULES TO ACHIEVE PERMANENCY FOR FOSTER
CHILDREN: SAMPLE RULES AND COMMENTARY 110 (1985); Note, Third Party Custody and
Visitation, supra note 124, at 176 ("grandparent visitation ceases to operate as soon as the child
regains a nuclear family through adoption"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-215(1) ("so that the adopted
individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes"); In re Adoption of
Schumacher, 458 N.E.2d 94, 97 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (adoption terminates all legal rights and
relationships between parents and "the natural parents' relatives in the child"); Ex parte Bronstein,
434 So. 2d 780, 782 (Ala. 1983). See also In re Robin N., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512 (1992) (de facto
parents may visit child over natural parents' objections if court finds that loss of contact will harm
the child); In re N.S., 821 P.2d 931 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (maternal grandmother's adoption after
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Some courts have denied standing to siblings who are not still liv-
ing in their parents' home. In one case, the mother's relatives who had
already adopted one sibling were denied standing in a hearing alleging
that the mother had abandoned her youngest child.20 9 In Weber v.
Weber210 the court denied standing to an adult sibling seeking visitation
with a minor sibling still residing with their natural parents. The court
determined that it could not order visitation unless there had been a
divorce or separation, a death of a natural parent, a dependency or delin-
quency hearing, or the petitioner already had custody of the child.2 '
The concurring opinion, however, stated that because siblings have the
"natural, inherent and inalienable right to visit with each other" the court
had jurisdiction to hear the adult sibling's petition.21 2 The court in L. v.
G.2 1 3 reached the opposite conclusion and granted adult siblings stand-
ing to petition for visitation with their minor sibling at a site away from
the parents' home in order to avoid the animosity between the father and
stepmother and themselves. "[T]his court is satisfied that it possesses
inherent equitable jurisdiction to entertain this action. '21 4  The court
held that it could grant sibling visitation over the objections of the
parents.21 5
Even though most jurisdictions recognize that both parents and
children are parties in child dependency cases, there is a split over
whether a trial court can order visitation in parental severance trials.2" 6
For instance, in TF. v. H.F.21 7 paternal grandparents petitioned for visi-
tation with their deceased son's child. The court granted visitation until
adoption by the stepparent, but rejected visitation after adoption because
termination of parental rights severed paternal grandparents' visitation rights); In re Marriage Of
Groleau, 585 N.E.2d 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (adoption by stepparent did not end paternal
grandparents' visitation order). But see In re Marriage Of Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1991) (the
court's finding of harm to the child by severing third party visitation must be found by clear and
convincing evidence). "When a child is adopted, he is issued a new birth certificate which
indicates that he was born to his adoptive parents." Note, Adoptee 's Equal Protection Rights, 28
UCLA L. REv. 1314, 1314-15 (1981).
209. Care and Protection of Zelda, 534 N.E.2d 7, 8-9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
210. 524 A.2d 498 (1987).
211. ld. at 499.
212. Id. at 499-500.
213. 497 A.2d 215 (1985).
214. Id. at 218.
215. Id. at 221.
216. In a dependency case "[a] parent and a child, both being parties, have a right to a speedy
adjudication hearing." D.M.B. v. T.B., 481 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Neb. 1992). "The minor has the
right to participate in a severance proceeding involving her." In re Cochise County Juv. Dep.
Action, 793 P.2d 566 (Ariz. App. 1990). In some permanency planning hearings, however, the
child is presumptively not present at the hearing. For instance, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 366.26(e)(1) provides, in relevant part, that "[tihe minor shall not be present in court unless the
minor so requests or the court so orders."
217. 483 N.W.2d 803, 804-07 (1992).
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the adoptive parents, like natural parents, should have the power to
determine with whom the child may associate after adoption.218  The
appellate court rejected that reasoning and instead held that once the
grandparents were granted visitation rights, they could not be deprived
of that association, even after adoption, without a due process hear-
ing.2 9 But in Adoption of Ridenour the court held that the juvenile court
abused its discretion in granting grandparents visitation rights after a
non-relative adoption.220 In In re HF. & F.F. the court held that grand-
parent visitation could continue after a stepparent adoption if the father
died, but not if the father voluntarily terminated his parental rights since
grandparent visitation was derivative of parental rights.22' One court
has held that a "court rendering a judgment of adoption has no jurisdic-
tion to simultaneously grant visitation rights to natural relatives of the
adopted child, and such provisions in adoption orders are void .... This
has been held to be true even where the parties have consented to the
provision." 222
Once siblings' associational rights are recognized as a fundamental
liberty interest, many of the distinctions articulated in conflicting hold-
ings regarding jurisdiction to consider adoption and future sibling visita-
218. The trial court's reasoning that parents have absolute control over the decision of with
whom the children will be permitted to associate was rejected in Mark V. v. Gale P., 540
N.Y.S.2d 966, 967 (Fam. Ct. 1989), which stated that "[c]hildren are not chattel and their right to
continue to know their siblings must be considered to be co-equal with a parent's right to choose
with whom his child associates."
219. Id. at 806. The concurring opinion relied, in part, upon a state statute giving the court
jurisdiction to "grant reasonable visitation rights to relatives who have maintained 'a relationship
similar to a parent-child relationship with a child who has been adopted.' " Id. at 807; see also
WIs. STAT. § 48.925 (1991). A similar result occurred in In re Adoption of Elizabeth Ann, Nos.
16-CA-89, 15-CA-89, 1990 WL 16039 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1990). The court held that
grandparents should be granted visitation subsequent to adoption and that it would be in the
child's best interest to be adopted by a family that would welcome continued grandparent
visitation. See also In re Adoption No. 92A41, 622 A.2d 150 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (holding
that an adoption decree does not automatically negate a grandparent's court-ordered visitation);
Dugas v. Adoption of Dugas, 614 So. 2d 228 (La. Ct. App. 1993). In In re Elizabeth M., 283 Cal.
Rptr. 483, 489 (Ct. App. 1991), the court held that "[s]ibling visitation, just like parent visitation,
is not inconsistent with an order authorizing a petition to terminate parental rights."
220. 574 N.E. 2d 1055, 1060 (Ohio 1991). The court relied upon OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3107.15 which provides that adoption terminates "all legal relationships between the adopted
person and his relatives."
221. 483 N.W. 803, 804-06 (Wis. 1992). At common law, grandparents' visitation rights were
derived through the natural parents. In re Adoption of a Child By M., 355 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
222. In re Adoption Of Schumacher, 458 N.E.2d 94, 99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (citations omitted).
See also In re J.M., 589 N.E.2d 1101 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (a court may not condition adoption on
the consent by adoptive parents to continued contact between child and the natural family); In re
Adoption Of Topel, 571 N.E.2d 1295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (consent to adoption by father on
condition of his continued visitation was invalid and sufficient basis to vitiate consent).
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tion at parental severance hearings disappear.223 If the siblings will be
separated during the period of legal limbo after parental severance but
before permanent placement through adoption, then their rights will
have been adversely harmed without a hearing. Because the longer sib-
lings remain apart the less likely that they will be permanently placed
together or that they will have liberal and frequent visitation if perma-
nently placed apart, the liberty loss can be permanent.224 Therefore, sib-
lings have a right to a timely hearing on their placements should parental
rights be severed. Since all parties will be present at the termination
hearing, it seems the most efficient and effective moment to litigate sib-
ling association rights.
Those opinions which hold that the issue of sibling custody and
visitation must wait until after adoption to permit the new adoptive par-
ents to determine with whom the adoptees can associate are not well
reasoned. First, to deny siblings a current determination of their per-
fected association rights elevates a non-fundamental liberty interest (the
prospective adoptive parents') over a fundamental interest (the sib-
lings'). Second, as was earlier discussed, there is no certainty that the
siblings will ever be adopted or that they will be adopted by the current
prospective adoptive parents.225 Therefore, the certain loss of sibling
association rights at parental severance substantially outweighs the
potential, yet not certain, rights of prospective adoptive parents to deter-
mine whether brothers and sisters should continue to see one another.
Perhaps most importantly, if the court indicates after parental severance
that siblings' best interests would be served by continued association,
then that finding will drive the Department's search for a permanent
placement which will either take custody of the siblings as a unit or
which will be willing to grant liberal sibling visitation. Further, not only
will siblings be able to continue associating until permanently placed,
223. Denying access to court process to perfect family relationships may deny due process.
Treiman, Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights-A Judicial Shell Game, 15 TULSA L.J. 183,
198-99 (1980) (discussing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)).
224. For a lengthy discussion of the effects of temporary custodial separation of siblings on
their permanent placements, see supra parts II and III.
225. Determining future child placements is not a science. "[In] adoption cases, courts must be
particularly careful to avoid conjecture as to future possible departmental action." Adoption Of
Michelle T., 117 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Ct. App. 1975). Also, a significant number of adoptive parents
seek to revoke adoptions. Kelley Bennison, No Deposit No Return: The Adoption Dilemma, 16
NOVA L. REV. 909 (1992); Kathleen M. Lynch, Adoption: Can Adoptive Parents Change Their
Minds?, 26 FAM. L.Q. 257 (1992); Mary Schwartz, Fraud in'the Nursery: Is the Wrongful
Adoption Remedy Enough?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 807 (1992); Note, When Love Is Not Enough:
Toward a Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1761 (1992). See also Note,
Annulment of Adoption Decrees on Petition of Adoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. L. 549 (1983-84);
Note, Constitutional Implications of Adoption Revocation Statutes, 8 PAC. L.J. 611 (1977); Note,
Abrogation of Adoption by Adoptive Parents, 19 FAM. L.Q. 155 (1985).
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but the court's best interest determination will also facilitate permanent
placements where continued sibling association will not detrimentally
affect the new permanent family relationships.
The second line of cases discussed above, which deny adult sib-
lings standing to seek judicially ordered visitation with minor children
still living with natural or adoptive parents, are equally vulnerable to due
process attack. First, can the state sufficiently justify eviscerating all
siblings' fundamental associational rights based upon the age of the sib-
lings or upon the residence of the siblings? It is one thing to say that a
court has jurisdiction to deny visitation between a minor sibling living
with parents and an adult sibling living apart if the court determines after
a due process hearing that such visitation would not be in the minor
sibling's best interest. But denying all adult siblings standing to bring a
visitation petition is overbroad and well beyond the compelling needs of
the state. A generalized state claim that such contested hearings may be
disruptive to some families is not a sufficiently compelling interest to
deny siblings a hearing. There are enumerable reasons why parents may
refuse to continue visitation between minor and adult siblings. Some of
those reasons may be irrational and unreasonable and only the court is in
a neutral position to determine whether the reasons are sufficient to war-
rant severance of siblings' associational rights.226 Permitting siblings a
hearing on their continued association after parental rights are termi-
nated is consistent with the modem trend of expanding siblings' stand-
ing to bring custody issues on their own rather than through a parent,
state attorney, or other third party representative.227
2. RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND RIGHT TO TESTIFY
The Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services228 held that
the three-pronged procedural due process test used in Mathews v.
Eldridge229 determines whether parents have a federal due process right
to counsel when the state attempts to interfere with the parent/child rela-
tionship. "The Court placed the burden on the moving party to rebut the
presumption that appointed counsel is not required in civil cases."23
The Lassiter court did not decide whether all parents must be appointed
226. Parents may refuse the sibling visits, not because they will harm the minor child, but
because they are angry with the adult child for reasons completely separate from the question of
what is in the minor child's best short and/or long-term interest.
227. See supra note 174 (citing recent cases granting children standing to bring actions to
determine whether parental rights should be terminated or whether custody arrangements should
be changed).
228. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
229. 424 U.S. 319, 336 (1976).
230. William Wesley Patton, It Matters Not What Is But What Might Have Been: The
Standard ofAppellate Review for Denial of Counsel in Child Dependency and Parental Severance
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counsel in dependency and parental severance trials, but rather left the
decision to trial courts on a case by case basis.231 In Lassiter, the Court
summarized the interests to be balanced:
[T]he parent's interest is an extremely important one (and may be
supplemented by the dangers of criminal liability . . .); the State
shares with the parent an interest in a correct decision, has a rela-
tively weak pecuniary interest, and, in some but not all cases, has a
possibly stronger interest in informal procedures; and the complexity
of the proceeding and the incapacity of the uncounseled parent could
be, but would not always be, great enough to make the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the parent's rights insupportably high.232
Because the Court concluded that the evidence in Lassiter was not com-
plicated, did not involve the examination of experts, did not involve any
difficult legal issues, and presented a very strong case for the State's
petition, denial of counsel was determined not to be fundamentally
unfair.
233
Cases where siblings wish to stay together are quite different from
routine parental severance cases, especially those common cases which
rarely involve battles among experts, such as allegations of abandon-
ment or failure to attend rehabilitative family reunification services. The
question of whether siblings should be placed together will require psy-
chological testimony in order to determine whether sibling bonds should
be preserved or whether the siblings' best interests will be better served
by separate placement, by visitation, or by confidential adoption.
Neither lawyers nor judges possess the necessary training to make those
determinations. Further, because siblings have a constitutional right to
remain together unless the State can prove otherwise, the State is likely
to present substantial expert testimony in order to meet its burden.
Because the State's position will be adverse to at least one of the sib-
lings who is attempting to perfect association, such a conflict of interest
requires the appointment of separate counsel. Nor can the parents'
counsel, if one is retained or appointed, necessarily present the siblings'
case because their interests may be completely conflicting. The chil-
drens' counsel may agree that severance from parents and placement of
siblings together may be in the children's best interests, while the par-
ents' counsel argues for no parent/child severance.234 Additionally, if
Trials, 12 WHrIER L. REv. 537, 538 (1991); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S.
18, 25-27 (1981).
231. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30-31.
232. Id. at 31.
233. Id. at 32.
234. Children's interests are frequently forgotten when the state and parents battle. John E. v.
John Doe, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439 (App. Div. 1990) provides a dramatic example. An unwed father
who had no prior relationship with his now three year old son sought to set aside an adoption in
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the parents' rights are severed, they may or may not want the children
placed with a relative, a custody decision which the children may
oppose.
Legal scholars have almost unanimously concluded that children
need independent counsel in dependency and parental severance hear-
1 35ings. In addition, "[b]y statute in almost every state, children in civil
child protective proceedings [child abuse and neglect] initiated by the
state or county have a right to have a representative appointed by the
court to independently protect their interests in the litigation." '236 But
few courts require appointment of counsel at parental termination hear-
ings where the family's and child's interests are greatest. 237 Nonethe-
less, because attorneys are very expensive, about half the states appoint
non-lawyers as lay guardians ad litem or as C.A.S.A.s (Court Appointed
Special Advocate) to represent the child.238 Most experts agree that lay
which the son had strongly bonded with the adoptive parents. The majority opinion did not
address the son's due process interests in the hearing and instead merely focused on what it
determined was the child's best interest placement. Justice Rosenblatt, concurring, noted that:
[n]o Law Guardian has been appointed to represent Daniel's interest. Surely, no
challenge to a child's legitimacy (and with it, custodial fate) should ever succeed
with no one representing the child's interest. To even contemplate an order of
filiation, which is to say, bastardization, with no representation for Daniel, would
amount to a condition in which the child's rights are not being adequately
protected ....
Id. at 448 n.4 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring).
235. "For over twenty-five years, observers and participants in the judicial process have
discussed the need for representation of children involved in custody disputes." Linda Elrod,
Counsel for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time Is Now, 26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 53 (1992); see id.
n.4 (providing a list of dozens of articles arguing for independent counsel for children). "Without
independent representation, it is impossible to guarantee that the best interests test will be applied
in such a manner as to protect the child's best interests." Emile R. Kruzick & David H. Zemans,
In the Best Interests of the Child. Mandatory Independent Representation, 69 DENv. U. L. REv.
605 (1992). See also Note, California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 317: Advocating a
Change to Require Independent Counsel for All Children, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1385, 1432
(1990). One court has determined that since contested adoption proceedings endanger children's
rights as much as parental termination hearings, independent counsel is required for the children.
In re Jay R., 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 1983).
236. Howard Davidson, The Child's Right to Be Heard and Represented in Judicial
Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 255, 268 (1991). Even though representation is mandated "[a]
recent study indicates that children ... are frequently not provided representation." Id. at 276.
237. Id. at 269. However, the court in In re Juan H., 13 Cal. Rptr. 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1992)
held that failure to appoint separate counsel for a 4-year-old was not prejudicial error because as
the child was "unable to effectively communicate his wishes to the social worker, he would also
be unable to communicate with independent counsel." The reasoning is quite weak for several
reasons. First, perhaps the child did not develop a trust relationship with the social worker
because the worker may have appeared hostile based upon previous meetings with the child and
other family members. Second, even if the child could not articulate desires in a sophisticated
manner, the independent counsel could still use her lawyering skills in fact investigation,
confrontation, cross-examination, motions, trial objections, and closing argument. The court's
analysis misses the strategic benefits to the child of having independent representation.
238. Davidson, supra note 236, at 268-69.
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representatives are not the equivalent of attorneys, and one court has
recently determined that a C.A.S.A can not file motions or appeals
because the C.A.S.A. function is merely to conduct an independent
investigation and report to the court.239 The inadequacies of lay repre-
sentation have been clearly delineated: 1) many jurisdictions define the
duty of the guardian ad litem as representing what she perceives to be
the child's best interests rather than the child's wishes; 2) there may not
be a guardian ad litem/child confidentiality privilege; 3) if the guardian
ad litem represents the child's wishes rather than the perceived best
interests of the child, judicial immunity may be waived, thus creating a
reason not to express the child's desires; 4) historically, guardians ad
litem have failed to conduct adequate investigations or continue repre-
senting children in cases throughout their judicial life because of "poor
reimbursement, heavy caseloads, and lack of supervision.
240
In what might seem to be a cost-containment measure, County Administration and
the Office of County Counsel [the state agency that prosecutes dependency and
parental severance cases] appear intent on eliminating or severely limiting the
appointment of minors' counsel. Minor's counsel has the opportunity, if it properly
performs its mandated investigatory function, to be the only totally objective party
to proceedings.
FAMILIES IN CRISIS: REPORT No. 2 SUPPLEMENT 6 (San Diego County Grand Jury June 29, 1992).
239. In re D.D.P., Jr., 819 P.2d 1212 (Kan. 1991). Also in In re Melicia L., 254 Cal. Rptr. 541
(Ct. App. 1988), the court held that a sibling in a dependency case was prejudiced by not being
appointed separate counsel since she was the only sibling not personally sexually abused and no
advocate argued whether she, as opposed to her brothers and sisters, should stay with her parents.
240. Elrod, supra note 235, at 59-69. New York has recently promulgated standards for
guardians ad litem that require a fact investigation that includes obtaining all relevant documents,
interviewing and observing the child, determining whether evaluations are necessary, and
interviewing all relevant parties and prospective witnesses. The new rules require the guardian ad
litem to continue with the case and represent the child in "any subsequent relevant proceeding,
including a modification, a violation, or an enforcement action." See Marie Walton & Donna
Schmalberger, Standards of Practice for Guardians Ad Litem, 12 ABA Juv. & CHILD WELFARE L.
REP. 11-12 (March 1993). Under the Colorado Bar Association Standards of Practice For
Guardians Ad Litem, the GAL is the attorney of record but "does not necessarily represent a
child's desires but should formulate an independent position regarding relevant issues." Further,
"[tihe child's wishes should be considered by the GAL, but need not be adopted by the GAL
unless doing so serves the child's best interest." Id. at 13. In a survey of juvenile delinquents
represented by guardians ad litem, 17% "did not know what the GAL was supposed to do."
Regina Huerter & Bonnie Saltzman, What Do "They" Think? The Delinquency Court Process in
Colorado as Viewed by the Youth, 69 DENY. U. L. REV. 345, 353 (1992). The adversary nature of
dependency cases sometimes obfuscates the best interests of children as the state and parents'
attorneys zealously represent their client's interests. Wanda Coats, Settlement and Negotiation of
Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse Cases, in USING THE LAW FOR CHILDREN: NEW HORIZONS FOR
ATTORNEYS AND EXPERT WITNESSES 78 (1992). Because the government attorneys bringing the
dependency or severance case have conflicts with the children's interest, they "are not the most
ideal representatives of children in dependency proceedings." Robert Fellmeth, Judicial and
Child Advocate Pilot Project, in USING THE LAW FOR CHILDREN: NEW HORIZONS FOR ATTORNEYS
AND EXPERT WITNESS 145; see also James Strickland, Risk Reduction Techniques for Child
Welfare and Protection Service Programs: Putting in Stop Bells and Whistles, in REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN COURT 52-53 (1990). "One of the major difficulties confronting children are the
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It is difficult to marshall any argument, other than cost, to deny
separate counsel to children who may not only lose contact with their
parents, but who may also permanently lose association with brothers
and sisters. Some might argue that even if providing children with
counsel is not prohibitively expensive, the additional lawyers will frus-
trate the informal nature of the hearings and will unduly delay the court
process. Those arguments mischaracterize the reality of the system.
First, these are not ordinary civil actions which take days, weeks, or
months to litigate. A study of the Los Angeles Dependency Court Sys-
tem found that each day a dependency judge hears between five to ten
new cases and as many as twenty-five periodic review hearings in other
cases.24 ' In addition, very few dependency cases are ever litigated in
court; only 2% to 10% of the cases are even calendared for trial since
almost all cases are informally resolved.24 2 Children's interests are at
even greater risk in those closed-door negotiations if they are not repre-
sented by independent counsel because the formal court machinery is
not present to protect them.243 When added to the numerous conflicts of
interest between the state attorney and children, and the inability of
guardians ad litem or C.A.S.A.s to zealously and competently represent
the child's wishes, the necessity of appointing independent legal counsel
for siblings becomes clear. Children, much more than parents, need an
attorney to present their case and rebut critical evidence which will per-
manently determine with whom they associate, bond, and develop as
mature citizens. 2" The description of most parent's inability to ade-
changes in their legal representation. Throughout the proceeding, the representatives may change
at different phases of the hearing process ... [which) has a detrimental impact on the quality of
the representation .... " Alan Watahara, California's Foster Care-Dependency System: Forgotten
Children in a Bureaucracy of Care 340 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkley,
1987). For an egregious example of representation by a guardian ad litem that the court termed
merely perfunctory yet not sufficient to warrant reversal, see In re J.V., 464 N.W.2d 887 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1990). In Bawidamann v. Bawidamann, 63 Ohio App. 3d 691 (Ct. App. 1989), the court
held that the guardian ad litem could not simultaneously act as the child's attorney and as a court
factfinder because of the conflict of interest in an attorney using his client's statements against
him.
241. THE CHILDREN's BUDGET OF Los ANGELES COUNTY GOVERNMENT: THE L.A.
ROUNDTABLE FOR CHILDREN 112 (1986); Children's Services Rx: More Money, Fewer Cases,
DAILY BREEZE, March 23, 1986, at Al; Child Abuse a Growing Tragedy in L.A. County, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1983, at 1.
242. See, William Wesley Patton, Child Abuse: The Irreconcilable Differences Between
Criminal Prosecution and Informal Dependency Court Mediation, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L.
37, 48-50, n.45 (1992-93).
243. For an analysis of the dangers of informal dispute resolution in child dependency and
parental severance cases, see Patton, supra note 121.
244. Children's right to counsel under Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18
(1981), will provide them much greater procedural protection than a mere statutory appointment
because many courts have held that statutory appointments do not provide the concomitant right to
competent counsel. For a discussion, see Patton, supra note 230, at 539-41. In In re Jamie T.T.,
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quately defend against termination proceedings applies logrithmically to
siblings who are about to be permanently separated.
Expert medical and psychiatric testimony, which few parents [and no
children] are equipped to understand and fewer still to confute, is
sometimes presented. The parents are likely to be people with little
education, who have had uncommon difficulty in dealing with life
[and children will have been abused and/or neglected], and who are,
at the hearing, thrust into a distressing and disorienting situation.
24 5
Obviously, the right to notice, standing, and counsel will mean very
little if siblings can not present their case and rebut the State's, parents',
and other third-party prospective adoptive parents', foster parents', and
relatives' arguments.246  Most state legislatures have recognized the
importance of gaining the child's views either in court or in chambers if
less hostile surroundings are needed to protect the child. "Approxi-
mately half the states have statutes listing the child's custodial wishes as
one factor the court must consider, or give special weight to, when mak-
ing custodial determination. '247 Since the child's personality, lifestyle,
and emotional bonds will be permanently determined by the court's
decision, denying access to the hearing to express their views and also to
assist counsel in marshalling and rebutting evidence would deny them
fundamental fairness.
No. 66712 (N.Y. App. Div. July 1, 1993), the court held that a 13-year-old child was denied her
constitutional right to effective counsel in an abuse and neglect proceeding since return of the
child to her father's custody could result in a liberty deprivation if the father, who she claimed
abused her, brought a status offense allegation against her.
245. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 29.
246. In In re Donna H., 602 A.2d 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), the court remanded a
dependency case where the trial court denied a child's counsel an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses, introduce testimony, or call witnesses. In re Brooke D., 598 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634 (App.
Div. 1993), the court stated that, "[iln the absence of separate representation of children with
conflicting interests concerning sibling visitation, it would have been impossible for the Law
Guardian to participate meaningfully in a hearing on that issue." Id.
247. Davidson, supra note 236, at 270. For a list of cases and statutes recently promulgated to
protect child victim/witness, see Patton, supra note 38, at 474 n.2. See also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.414 (D)(2), (3) (providing that the court in determining permanent custody shall
consider "[tihe wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through his guardian ad
litem, -with due regard for the maturity of the child"); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(g)
(providing that in "all termination proceedings the court shall consider the wishes of the child");
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (providing that if a child is 12 or older, the child's consent to
adoption "shall be given in court, provided that the court in its discretion may waive this
requirement"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-332 (A)(2), (3) (providing that the court may consider
"[t]he wishes of the child as to his custodian"); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3. The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 12, Section I provides that "[s]tates parties shall
assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views
freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in
accordance with the age and maturity of the child." Davidson, supra note 236, at 255 (quoting
from the U.N. CHARTER).
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3. THE PROPER BURDEN OF PROOF FOR SEPARATING SIBLINGS IS
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
The Court in Santosky v. Kramer held that the State must demon-
strate by clear and convincing evidence that parental rights should be
terminated; the standard of review has both "practical and symbolic con-
sequences." '248 "The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of fact finding, is
to 'instruct the factfmder concerning the degree of confidence our soci-
ety thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication.' ",249 After Santosky noted the tremen-
dously unequal resources the State can marshall against parents' usually
meager resources, and after assuming that in termination hearings the
"State, the parents, and the child are all represented by counsel," 250 the
Court held that fundamental fairness required a clear and convincing
demonstration of the necessity of parental termination and that the ele-
vated standard would not create an economic burden on the State.25'
It is difficult to argue that siblings who may not be represented by
an attorney, or who are merely represented by a lay guardian ad litem or
C.A.S.A., have the ability to marshall a case comparable to the State's.
Children will be less able than adults to assist their representative in the
complex fact investigation, case preparation, direct and cross examina-
tion of witnesses, and closing argument. If anything, when the court is
248. 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982). See also In re Adoption of A.G.K., 728 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. 1986)
(holding that clear and convincing evidence is required before parental rights may be severed).
249. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
250. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 749 n.2, 761-62.
251. The California Supreme Court in Cynthia D. v. Superior Court Of San Diego County, 93
D.A.R. 6788 (Cal. 1993), held that parental termination pursuant to CALIFORNIA WELFARE &
INSTITUTIONS CODE § 366.26 can be supported by a preponderance of the evidence standard
because the California system differs significantly from the.one reviewed in Santosky. The court
noted that the California hearing centers on whether the child is adoptable and on a finding that
family reunification services should end, and not on an initial determination of parental unfitness.
Id. at 6790, 6792. Second, the court stated that the risk of erroneous factfinding was reduced in
the California system which attempts to reunify the family members through a succession of
hearings where parents are represented by counsel. Justice Kennard, dissenting, stated that:
When termination of parental rights is at issue under the California dependency
statutes, the child will always be a dependent of the court and not in parental
custody. This situation tends to magnify the state's ability to marshall its case.
Moreover, the potential for class or cultural bias in a decision... is no less acute in
California than in New York.
Id. at 6797. The Cynthia D. holding was predicated to a great extent on the mandatory appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent parents. No similar California statute, however, mandates appoint-
ment of counsel for children in informal hearings where siblings may be separated. Therefore,
even should the United States Supreme Court uphold the lower standard of proof in Cynthia D., it
would not change the need for the higher clear and convincing evidence standard when the court
involuntarily severs siblings' association rights.
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considering the permanent severance of sibling association, the risk of
factual errors or undiscovered evidence is magnified. Because using a
clear and convincing evidence standard will provide more fundamentally
fair and accurate procedures, and because it will not impose "substantial
fiscal burdens on the state," that standard should be adopted as a mini-
mum factual threshold.25 2
Because siblings' association rights are fundamental, the state's
burden to justify severance should require a showing of a compelling
governmental interest and that severance is the least drastic alternative
capable of achieving that interest. The entire child dependency system
is centered on a less drastic alternative model. The Federal Adoption
and Assistance Act and all state statutory child dependency schemes
start with the premise that state intrusion into the family should be as
limited as possible while still protecting children. State involvement
begins with an investigation and then can proceed through a series of
more drastic measures, such as informal supervision, formal supervision
with court imposed conditions, temporary out-of-home custody of chil-
dren, and as a last resort, parental severance.253
Although the Court has most often used a less drastic alternative
analysis in First Amendment cases, 2 54 it has also similarly limited gov-
252. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767. The failure of courts to recognize that separating siblings
in a parental termination raises constitutional association issues has infected the standard of
appellate review. Instead of applying a harmless error standard, courts treat the issue like one of
custody determinations in divorce cases. The trial court's decision to separate siblings will be
affirmed unless the appellate court finds that the decision was "plainly wrong or unsupported by
the evidence." Fowler v. City Of Manassas Dep't Of Social Servs., 1995 WL 16575 (Va. Ct. App.
January 17, 1995).
253. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 670; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODES § 300; Patton, supra note 38, at 483-
96. States have more than a humanitarian interest in using a less drastic alternative analysis
because removing children temporarily or permanently from their parents is extremely expensive.
"[lI]t costs approximately $3000 a year to provide a family with abuse counselling and in-home
services through the civil dependency system" and "every $1 spent on family preservation saved
$3 in long term costs." Patton, supra note 121, at 41, 49 (relying on WENDY LAZARUS &
MICHELLE GONZALEZ, CALIFORNIA: THE STATE OF OUR CHILDREN 10 (1989)); THE CRISIS IN
FOSTER CARE: REPORT No. 7, 6 (Report by the 1991-92 San Diego Grand Jury, June 29, 1992)
(analyzing LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, MENDING OUR BROKEN CHILDREN: RESTRUCTURING
FOSTER CARE IN CALIFORNIA (1992)). Nationally, the cost of foster care is approximately $3
billion a year, with a general average of $10,000 per foster child. Besharov, The Misuse of Foster
Care: When the Desire to Help Children Outruns the Ability to Improve Parental Functioning, 20
FAM. L.Q. 213, 230 (1986). It costs $6,000 per month to place children in the L.A. County run
MacLaren Children's Center, $1500-$4,000 for a group home placement, and $300-S1,200 in
foster care (depending upon the child's needs). Sandra Parker, New Avenue for Legal Aid.
Children's Rights Project, L.A.D.J., May 22, 1990, section II, at I. In New York, foster or
adoptive subsidies for a special needs child cost $371 to $1290 per month, whereas "the standard
welfare allotment for one's own biological child is about $104 per month." Ellen Hopkins,
Adopting. The Color Line, MIRABELLA, May, 1990, at 66.
254. See TRIBE, supra note 150, at 983-86. See also Guy M. Struve, The Less-Restrictive
Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1463 (1967).
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ernmental regulation of privacy. For instance, in Hodgson v. Minnesota
the Court noted recently that the Minnesota abortion statute was unrea-
sonable and that the state could "adopt less burdensome means to protect
the minor's welfare. 255 State courts have also required a less drastic
alternative analysis before terminating parental rights.256 The same
rationale applies to the state's assertion that siblings should be separated.
Requiring a less drastic alternative analysis to sibling association issues
is thus consistent with all current federal and state statutory policies of
keeping families together whenever possible.
Under a less drastic alternative analysis the state must first demon-
strate that it is not possible to find an acceptable placement which will
maintain the sibling group. If no such placement exists, the state must
next proffer a plan which will provide siblings in different placements
the best opportunity to continue contact; frequent and extensive visita-
tion should be provided. Finally, if the state argues that one or more
siblings should be permanently severed into a confidential adoptive
home, the state should be required to demonstrate: 1) that it has used
reasonable efforts to secure adoptive placements for the entire sibling
group and that it has attempted to locate such a placement for a reason-
able period of time; 2) that splitting the siblings is in their best interests
rather than keeping them together in long term guardianship or in a
small group home;2 57 3) that if separation is required, reasonable efforts
have been made to secure adoption with a family that will permit and
encourage continued association among siblings; and 4) if confidential
adoptive placement is needed, that the state will provide a means for
adult siblings to locate one another.
Under the less drastic means test, state statutes that prohibit sibling
visitation after adoption are unconstitutionally overbroad since they
255. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2929, 2947 (1990).
256. See, e.g., In re Carmaleta B., 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1978). Sometimes the less drastic
alternative test is no more than a demonstration that the custody plan is in the best interest of the
child. The test "can be met by showing that return of the minor [to the parents] will mean
disrupting a healthy existing bond with psychological parents in the mere hope that the biological
parents will one day be able to provide a suitable 'home.' " Van Deusen, supra note 121, at 430;
see also In re Appeal In Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 840 P.2d 730 (Ariz. 1990) (holding
that before a father's contacts with the child could be severed, the state must demonstrate that the
change would be in the child's best interest). See also Petition of Department Of Public Welfare,
381 N.E.2d 565, 569-73 (Mass. 1978) (the least drastic alternative analysis must consider the
rights and needs of the parents, child and state).
257. Today, the preferred form of residential treatment is the group home. The group
home theoretically has the dual advantage of offering a therapeutic setting and a
personal atmosphere modeled on an extended family ... yet the potential of group
homes has not been realized, in part, because residential treatment has been
relegated to a disfavored status.
Susan Brooks, Rethinking Adoption: A Federal Solution to the Problem of Permanency Planning
for Children with Special Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1130, 1162-63 (1991).
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
totally sever all separated siblings' association rights without a demon-
stration by the state that visitation will either make permanent child
placement unreasonably difficult or cause substantial harm to the chil-
dren. In addition, it is not enough that the state present evidence that
keeping siblings together may cause some harm to the children or may
create some difficulty for the Department. The short-term psychological
harm to siblings must be considered together with the long-term effects
of separating them.2"' For instance, in Hadick v. Hadick,2 59 an expert
testified that separating two healthy siblings from their handicapped
brother would be best because keeping them all together would disad-
vantage the healthy children in so far as the handicapped sibling's needs
would always come first. The appellate court, however, noted that even
though it might be easier to separate the siblings, it was just as likely
that the healthy siblings would benefit and be strengthened by helping
with the care because they would learn "sensitivity, caring, loving, and
understanding." 2" If the state can demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence, in a hearing that affords siblings procedural protection, that
the separation of siblings is in their long-term best interests, then justice
will have been served.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a recent divorce settlement Judge Dennis J. Quillen gave the
divorcing spouses one dog each on Monday through Saturday. On Sun-
days each spouse was granted visitation with both dogs for four hours.
The judge further ordered that the dogs have time to visit with one
another and "undergo an examination by a veterinarian to determine if
separation causes any psychological damage [to the dogs]." '2 61 Would
that siblings were treated like dogs.
Tens of thousands of brothers and sisters are torn apart and placed
in separate homes without adequate due process hearings, without a
258. For a sophisticated analysis of short versus long-term effects of sibling placement, see In
re Carlos A., 1992 WL 161990 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 2, 1992). The court in In re Guardianship
of J.C., 608 A.2d 1312, 1320 (N.J. 1992) held that the state must prove "by clear and convincing
evidence that separating the child from his or her foster parents [by returning her to her natural
parents] would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm."
259. 603 A.2d 915, 921-22 (1992).
260. Id. at 921-22. Courts and legislatures view children as vulnerable when convenient and as
self-reliant when it serves purposes such as waiving constitutional rights or in declaring
emancipation from their parents. "Declarations of emancipation are obtained with stunning ease
and speed ... the few hearings that were held were perfunctory, often taking five or ten minutes
.. . [and the] exchange between the judge and minor was minimal at best." Carol Sanger &
Elenor Willeman, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MIcH. J. L.
REF. 239, 247 (1992).
261. Dick Goldberg, The Law Revue: Divorce Is Rough on the Little Ones, L.A.D.J., Dec. 9,
1992, section II, at I.
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showing of necessity, without a demonstration of less intrusive viola-
tions of their liberty interest in associating, and without evidence that
eliminating short-term trauma will provide long-term psychological
health. It is time to protect Hansel and Gretel from legislative and judi-
cial good intentions. It may be better they remain together in an old
brick building than be unnecessarily separated into different candy-
coated cottages.
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APPENDIX
The following sibling data was used to compile the comparative
sibling placement chart, supra Chart II and the statistical discussion,
supra Part III.
I. ALABAMA
Alabama has very few children in foster care. In 1990, there were
1,058,788 children under 18 living in state and only 25,473 reports of
child abuse were received.262 In 1990, 37,173 children were the subject
of child abuse investigations and in 16,009 of those cases abuse was
substantiated.263 Of the substantiated cases, only 489 children were
removed from their home, and 5,785 families received additional serv-
ices regarding child abuse.26 In 1992, Alabama placed 37 sibling
groups for adoption:
1. 19 groups of 2 siblings;
2. 14 groups of 3 siblings;
3. 3 groups of 4 siblings; and
4. 1 group of 6 siblings.2
65
Data regarding the number of siblings separated into different
placements and the frequency of sibling visitation in Alabama was not
available.
II. CALIFORNIA
In 1990, there were 7,750,725 children under 18 living in Califor-
nia and there were 343,222 reports of child abuse or neglect involving
553,782 children. 66 Of those reports, 53,236 were substantiated,
involving 78,512 children.2 67 California has a very- high percentage of
children removed from their homes during dependency hearings. "Con-
sistently since 1981 courts have removed two-thirds of all children at the
dispositional hearing. '' 268 Between 67,000 to 100,000 children lived in
262. NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8.
263. Id. at 12.
264. Id. at 17. The number of children removed from their home in Alabama is lower than the
national median. "Thirty-three States reported that approximately 73,500 children were removed
from their homes during 1990. These children were approximately 13 percent of the children who
were substantiated and/or indicated in their States." Id. at 27. However, those 33 reporting states
did not include the states with the largest number of substantiated cases of abuse such as
California and New York.
265. Letter from Judge Richardson, Consultant Office of Foster Care, State of Alabama
Department of Human Resources, to Professor Patton (Oct. 5, 1992) (on file with the author).
266. NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8.
267. Id. at 8, 12. "In California, there were 45,924 dependency court filings during fiscal year
1988-1989. Where Have All the Children Gone?, supra note 40, at 126 n.5 (citing 2 JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 63 (1990)). In 1989, "2,584 more children entered the
system than exited." Id. at 129 n.30.
268. Where Have All The Children Gone?, supra note 40, at 130 n.31. In Los Angeles
dependency dispositional hearings in 1989, 68% of the children were removed from the parents'
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out-of-home placements in California each year between 1989-1992.269
Although California does not keep records of sibling out-of-home place-
ments, it was recently stated to the California Legislature that "between
56% and 85% of children in care also have siblings in care. ' 270 There-
fore, if we take the most conservative estimate of the number of Califor-
nia children living in out-of-home placements in 1990, 67,000, and
multiply it by the most conservative estimate of the percentage of those
children with siblings, 56%, we determine that approximately 37,500
siblings were living in out-of-home placements in California in 1990.
California, however, does not formally track or report the number of
siblings who are placed into different out-of-home care.
In order to determine how many siblings were placed into separate
out-of-home arrangements, we twice ran computer analyses on the Cali-
fornia Foster Care Information Data System.2 71 Our data demonstrates
that approximately 19,000 or 40% of siblings were sent into different
placements in 1991.
August 9, 1990 California Computer Program
1. Approximate number of children in California out-of-
home placements: 80,000
2. Total number of siblings in out-of-home placements: 47,098
3. Number of siblings in separate out-of-home placements
searching by (1) duplicate case serial number and (2) name
of placement facility: 26,464
home: 134 (1%) were placed with relatives; 6316 (65%) were in placed in suitable out-of-home
placements; and 221 (2%) were put in other placements. ICAN DATA ANALYSIS REPORT FOR
1990, 11-6, p. 6 (Los Angeles Inter-agency Council on Child Abuse and Neglect 1990).
269. The House Select Committee On Children estimated that 100,000 California children
lived in out-of-home placements in 1990. See supra note 45. It is difficult to determine the exact
number of California children in out-of-home placements because federal reporting criteria are not
standardized and since reports use different dates for reporting. There were 67,687 in out-of-home
placements in 1989. LAZARUS & GONZALEZ, supra note 253, at 21. By April, 1990, the number
had grown to 78,221. CHILDREN Now, THE 1990 CALIFORNIA CHILDREN'S REPORT CARD: THE
RIGHT START FOR CALIFORNIA'S CHILDREN, AN ACTION PLAN 42 (1990).
270. This data was presented by the Capitol Resource Institute and the Coalition of California
Welfare Rights Organizations to the California Assembly Committee On Judiciary, Phillip
Isenberg, Chair, Hearing on Assembly Bill 3332, Record of April 1, 1992. (copy of report in the
Whittier Library).
271. See supra note 46. The computer program number was 90-120.
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November 8, 1991 California Computer Program
1. Approximate number of children in California out-of-
home placements: 84,000
2. Total number of siblings in out-of-home placements: 47,337
3. Number of siblings placed in separate out-of-home place-
ments searching by (1) duplicate serial number and (2)
name of placement facility: 27,016
4. Number of Siblings placed in separate out-of-home place-
ments searching by (1) duplicate serial number, (2) name
of placement facility, and (3) last name: 19,016
The data suggests that in California the relative number and per-
centage of siblings in separate out-of-home care has been constant for
the past two years. By refining our computer search to three variables,
the percentage of separated siblings on November 8, 1991 was approxi-
mately 40% (19,016 of 47,337 siblings), and the number of separated
siblings was approximately 23% of all California children placed in out-
of-home care (19,016 of 84,000).
III. FLORIDA
In 1990, there were 2,866,237 children under 18 living in Flor-
ida.2 2 During 1990, there were 127,034 reports of child abuse involv-
ing 182,527 children; 24,718 cases were substantiated and 11,840
children were removed from their homes.27 Approximately 4500 chil-
dren entered foster care and only 1065 children were placed for adop-
tion, but Florida does not keep records regarding sibling placements.274
IV. HAWAII
Hawaii had 280,126 children under 18 living in the state in 1990.275
There were 3652 child abuse reports involving 3421 children; 2078
cases were substantiated and 657 children were removed from their
homes. 276 Although data regarding siblings was not available for 1990,
in 1991 there were "320 sibling groups identified in substitute care,
involving 821 children in placement. 2 77 The placement objectives for
those 320 sibling groups were:
1. 61 sibling groups had at least one child with an adoptive goal;
2. 7 sibling groups had at least one child with an adoptive goal and
272. NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8.
273. Id. at 8, 12, 17. "Permanency planning assumes that every child is adoptable." Paul
Christoff, Children In Limbo, 10 J. Juv. L. 73, 75 (1990.
274. Letter from Linda Radigan, Assistant Secretary for Children and Family Services, Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, to Professor Patton (Oct. 7, 1992) (on file with
the author).
275. NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8.
276. Id. at 8, 12, 17.
277. Higashide, supra note 57.
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at least one child with a goal other than adoption, such as reunifi-
cation or permanent substitute care.278
V. ILLINOIS
In 1990, Illinois had 2,946,366 children under 18.279 The state had
61,191 reports of abuse affecting 104,449 children; in 37,539 cases child
abuse was substantiated.280 Of those children, 5392 were removed from
their home.28" ' For the period of January to August 1992 there were
13,788 out-of-home placements. The greatest concentration of place-
ments were:
1. 5,859 were placed in foster care with relatives;
2. 2,787 were put in foster-home board;
3. 1,280 went to emergency shelters;
4. Only 121 were placed in group homes.282
There were 8601 siblings in the 13,788 out-of-home placements.
Of those siblings 5092 were placed with the same care provider and
3509, or 41%, were separated into different placements..283 The smaller
the sibling group, however, the more likely they were placed together
with the same provider. For instance, of the 2742 "2 children sibling
groups," 2058 were placed together and 684, or 25%, were separated
into different placements.284 Of the 1488 "4 children sibling groups,"
704 were placed in the same home, while 744, or approximately 50%
were put into different placements.285
VI. KENTUCKY
In 1990, there were 954,454 children under 18 living in Ken-
tucky. 286 There were 30,420 child abuse reports involving 48,645 chil-
dren; of the 13,933 substantiated reports, 1674 children were removed
from their homes.287 Kentucky maintains little sibling data, but, in
1991, 3139 of 9894 children placed in foster care had siblings.2"' There-
fore, 32% of foster placements involved siblings.
278. Id.
279. NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLEC T DATA SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8.
280. Id. at 12.
281. Id. at 17.
282. These statistics were compiled by Carl Sciarini, Bureau of Quality Assurance, Department
Of Children And Family Services, State of Illinois, Letter to Professor Patton at 1 (Sept. 23, 1992)
(on file with the author).
283. Id. at 2.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8.
287. Id. at 8, 17.
288. Letter from Mary Stewart, Program Coordinator Child Abuse/Neglect Central Registry,
Cabinet For Human Resources Commonwealth of Kentucky, to Professor Patton (Nov. 2, 1992)
(on file with the author).
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VII. MASSACHUSETTS
In 1990, Massachusetts had 1,353,075 children under 18.289 There
were 36,193 child abuse reports involving 57,983 children and out of
17,840 substantiated reports, 2649 children were removed from their
homes. 290 Although Massachusetts was unable to provide us with data
regarding sibling pre-adoption statistics, the data regarding sibling adop-
tion placements demonstrated Massachusetts's commitment to maintain-
ing sibling association. For example, "[o]f the 595 children adopted [in
1991], 290 (49%) were members of 130 sibling groups. Adoptions of
siblings rose 8% over FY'90. '291 Twenty-nine percent of all adoption
subsidies went to sibling group adoptions.292 In addition, in 1991, "103
children in 41 sibling groups received guardianships. '293 Although no
data exists regarding the percentage of Massachusetts sibling guardian-
ships receiving guardianship subsidy, there was a 13% increase in subsi-
dized guardianships compared to 1990.294
VIII. NEW YORK
New York maintains the most detailed and complete sibling place-
ment data of any state. Between November, 1980 and June, 1981, there
were between 40,000 and 45,000 New York children in out-of-home
placement.295 "Approximately half of the children in out of home care
also had siblings in out of home care. 296 Between 1986 and 1991, the
New York City foster care population increased 279% from 18,205 to
50,714; the Upstate New York foster care population increased 32%
from 10,693 to 14,144 during the same period.2 97 In 1990, New York
had 4,259,549 children under 18 living in the state.29' There were
129,709 child abuse reports involving 212,767 children. 299 The number
of substantiated reports was 26,053.300 In 1990, "70% of the siblings of
289. NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8.
290, Id. at 8, 11, 17.
291, Mo, supra note 59.
292. Id. at 7.
293. Id. at 6.
294. Id. at 7.
295. JOSEPH COCOZZA & ROBERT INGALLS, THE OUT OF HOME PROJECT: CHARACTERISTICS OF
CHILDREN IN OUT OF HOME CARE 12, 14 (NEW YORK STATE COUNCIL ON CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, 1984).
296. Id. at 15. "More children from New York City had siblings in out of home care than did
children from other parts of the state." Id. at 66 (51% versus 43%). By 1991, New York City
accounted "for approximately three-quarters of all children in foster care" in the State of New
York. FAMILY & CHILDREN SERVS. IN N.Y., A SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON
SELECTED SERVICES AS REQUIRED BY CHAPTER 409 OF THE LAWS OF 1991, i (NEW YORK DEP'T
OF SOCIAL SERVS. 1992).
297. FAMILY & CHILDREN SERVS. IN N.Y., supra note 296, at ii.
298. NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8.
299. Id. at 8.
300. Id. at 1I.
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the child in the foster care sample were also in foster care."'30 1
The number of child abuse cases processed in New York continued
to increase in 1991 to 131,796.302 Child abuse was indicated after inves-
tigation in 25,226 of those reports.30 3 In 1991, there were 19,856 new
foster care admissions, 18,399 discharges, and 64,858 children in state-
wide foster care.3° In total, "83,257 children were in care at some time
during 1991."305 The sibling population in New York was:
Siblings Statewide Placed In Foster Care During 1991306
Separated 30 7  Partly Separated 318  Intact 30 9
N3 10  %311 N % N %
Group Size
2 958 24.2 3002 75.8
3 111 4.0 762 28.7 1779 67.0
4 or More 24 0.7 2,006 65.2 1047 34.0
Siblings In Foster Care On December 31, 1991 Statewide
312
Separated Partly Separated Intact
N % N % N %
Group Size
2 5100 34.3 9750 65.7
3 1800 14.0 4683 36.5 6333 49.4
4 or More 781 4.7 11625 70.3 4131 25.0
301. FAMILIES IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM: FOSTER CARE AND PREVENTIVE SERVICES IN
THE NINETIES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, ii (NEW YORK DEP'T SOCIAL SERVS. 1992).
302. 1991 MONITORING AND ANALYSIS PROFILES WITH SELECTED TREND DATA: 1987-1991, 2
(MONITORING AND ANALYSIS UNIT 1991, DIV. FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVS. PERFORMANCE,
NEW YORK DEP'T SOCIAL SERVS.).
303. Id. at 3.
304. Id. at 14a.
305. FAMILY & CHILDREN SERVS. IN N.Y., supra note 289, at 12.
306. All data for this chart is from id. at 9. All definitions of the terms in this chart are from
1991 MONITORING AND ANALYSIS PROFILES WITH SELECTED TREND DATA, supra note 295, at 16.
307. "Separated" means all of the siblings in a sibling group of the specified size are in
separate facilities.
308. "Partly Separated" means some of the siblings in a sibling group of the specified size are
in separate facilities.
309. "Intact" means all of the siblings in a sibling group of the specified size are in the same
facility.
310. "N" equals the number of children in foster care on December 31, 1991 who had a sibling
in foster care.
311. "%" is the number of siblings who are separated, partly separated, or intact as a
percentage of all siblings in a sibling group of the same size.
312. All data for this chart is from 1991 MONITORING AND ANALYSIS PROFILES WITH SELECTED
TREND DATA, supra note 302, at 16.
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IX. SOUTH CAROLINA
In 1990, South Carolina had 920,207 children under 18 living in
state. 13 There were 18,082 reports of child abuse involving 28,615 chil-
dren; of the 5688 substantiated cases, 1797 children were removed from
their homes. 314 South Carolina was unable to provide sibling foster care
placement data; however, they stated that in 1991 the Department of
Social Services placed 40 sibling groups for adoption, and in 1992, they
placed 42 sibling groups for adoption.315
313. NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM, supra note 51, at 8.
314. Id. at 8, 11, 17.
315. Bogan, supra note 63.
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